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KNOWLEDGE ABOUT LEGAL SANCTIONS 
Stephen McG. Bundy* 
and Einer Elhauge ** 
For a system that likes to say that ignorance of its rules is no ex-
cuse, the legal system can be remarkably ambivalent about whether 
the dissemination of knowledge about those rules is good or bad. 
Lawyers have, in particular, been roundly condemned for providing 
truthful information about the law that helps clients avoid punishment 
for wrongdoing, exploit loopholes to engage in legal but undesirable 
activity, recognize illegal activities that have low penalties or chances 
of detection, and do better in litigation than they should have. 1 Igno-
rance of the law may be no excuse, but too much knowledge of the law 
is, apparently, no virtue. 
Often, however, knowledge or advice about the law is undeniably 
desirable. How, then, do we sort out the good from the bad? The 
legal profession's answer, at least as reflected in its rules governing the 
provision of advice to a client, has been to presume that advice is 
strongly desirable. Traditionally those rules have required lawyers to 
provide their clients with complete and accurate advice about the law 
and the legal system, unless the lawyer knows that the advice will sim-
ply further criminal or fraudulent conduct. 2 
Many observers believe that this approach allows lawyers to give 
far too much undesirable advice. One responsive intuition has been to 
distinguish between functional categories of advice: for example, be-
tween advice that alters legal penalties (or sanctions) for a given 
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1. See, e.g .• JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUS-
TICE 80-87 (1949) (describing lawyers' tactics); MARVIN FRANKEL, PARTISAN JUSTICE 21-38 
(1980) (same); William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering. 101 HARV. L. REV. 1083, 
1085 (1988) (same). 
2. Under the MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1992), this basic result flows 
from Rule 2.1 ("[A] lawyer shall ... render candid advice.") and Rule 1.2(d) ("A lawyer shall 
not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or 
fraudulent .... ") See also MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 3.3, 3.4 (1992) 
(applying similar standards to litigation conduct). 
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course of conduct and advice that informs clients about the scope and 
level of conduct sanctions. 3 This perspective views litigation advice as 
obstructionist, helping many individuals avoid sanctions for their past 
conduct. It regards legal counseling more favorably because it helps 
individuals conform their future conduct to the law. 
This perspective has recently found more structured support in a 
series of leading articles by Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, which 
offer economic models purporting to demonstrate a "sharp contrast" 
between the social desirability of legal advice given before actors en-
gage in primary conduct and legal advice during litigation. 4 If the 
applicable legal sanctions are appropriately set, they argue, legal ad-
vice given to parties planning primary conduct will communicate 
those sanctions and improve behavior. In contrast, they conclude that 
legal advice during litigation is as likely to increase as to decrease the 
information reaching tribunals about past conduct and therefore has 
"questionable social value."5 Accordingly, they put forth (without 
quite advocating) various proposals that would in effect restrict litiga-
tion advice. 6 
Another influential account, however, takes a precisely opposite 
categorical approach, arguing that, while lawyers should be free to 
provide advice in litigation consistent with generally accepted partisan 
norms, a more restrictive standard should govern the provision of pre-
litigation advice. The first and most famous proponent of this view 
was Lon Fuller, who strongly defended traditional standards gov-
3. This line has similarities to what William Simon has described as the regulatory approach 
to legal ethics. See Simon, supra note 1, at 1085-87. 
4. See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Legal Advice About Information To Present in Litiga· 
tion: Its Effects and Social Desirability, 102 HARV. L. REV. 567, 597, 600, 614 (1989) [hereinaf· 
ter Kaplow & Shavell, Legal Advice About Information]; Steven Shavell, Legal Advice About 
Contemplated Acts: The Decisions To Obtain Advice, Its Social Desirability, and Protection of 
Confidentiality, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 123 (1988) [hereinafter Shaven, Legal Advice About Contem· 
plated Acts]; see also Louis Kaplow & Steven Shaven, Legal Advice About Acts Already Commit· 
ted, 10 INTL. REV. L. & EcoN. 149, 158 (1990) [hereinafter Kaplow & Shavell, Legal Advice 
About Acts Already Committed] (drawing same distinction between advice provided before and 
after conduct). Shaven draws another sharp distinction between advice that informs parties 
about the scope or level of expected sanctions and advice that helps parties lower expected sane· 
tions. Shavell, supra, at 136-39. 
5. See Kaplow & Shaven, Legal Advice About Acts Already Committed, supra note 4, at 152; 
Kaplow & Shavell, Legal Advice About Information, supra note 4, at 568-69, 597, 614. 
6. See Kaplow & Shavell, Legal Advice About Information, supra note 4, at 611-13 (propos· 
ing narrowing confidentiality for litigation advice, requiring litigators to work for the state, or 
not allowing a party to obtain litigation advice until they have been deposed); see also LLOYD L. 
WEINREB, DENIAL OF JUSTICE 147-64 (1977) (proposing judicial questioning of criminal defend-
ants before they consult with their lawyers); Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for Truth: An 
Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031, 1055-57 (1975) (proposing a disclosure requirement as 
long as no privilege is breached). Such proposals would effectively restrict the dissemination of 
accurate knowledge about litigation sanctions by creating disincentives for the client to ask for it 
or for the attorney to provide it, or by directly barring such dissemination until after depositions. 
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erning the provision of legal advice in litigation but argued that in 
counseling professional norms should not "grant any license to the 
lawyer to participate as legal advisor in a line of conduct that is im-
moral, unfair, or of doubtful legality."7 The view that different and 
stricter standards should govern the provision of nonlitigation advice 
retains wide support today. 8 
An alternative line of analysis, most prominently developed by 
William Simon, rejects both the above categorical approaches in favor 
of a case-by-case approach. This line recognizes that advice of all 
forms can contribute to undesirable consequences. Accordingly, Si-
mon concludes that lawyers should deny advice - that is, refuse to 
disseminate accurate information about the law - in any setting in 
which such advice would not "promote justice."9 Simon, indeed, ar-
gues that the professional code should not only allow, but require, law-
yers to exercise their discretionary judgment to deny advice in such 
circumstances, with the possible exception of situations in which such 
a professional canon would not be practically enforceable.10 To the 
extent such professional canons are to have meaningful effects on cli-
ent behavior, which is their intent, they must effectively deny clients 
access to truthful information about the law when it would lead to 
undesirable consequences. 
Recent developments in the regulation of lawyers demonstrate that 
these categorical and noncategorical views have much more than theo-
retical interest. For example, the 1983 amendments to Rule 11 of the 
7. Lon L. Fuller & John D. Randall, Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint Confer-
ence, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159, 1161 (1958). Given Fuller's evocative but vague formulation of the 
limits on partisan advocacy, it is unclear whether he would have endorsed every detail of conven-
tional advocacy norms. See id. (arguing that norms of partisanship should forbid an advocate 
before a tribunal from seeking to "muddy the headwaters of decision"). But it is undeniable that 
in his conception advocates should have substantially more freedom than counselors to provide 
advice and assistance. 
8. See David B. Wilkins, Making Context Count: Regulating Lawyers After Kaye, Scholer, 66 
S. CAL. L. REV. 1145, 1183 (1993) ("The ethical constraints on the actions a lawyer can take on 
behalf of a client in an adversary proceeding are, and ought to be, different from the constraints 
on a lawyer acting outside this context."); see also id. at 1183-85 (describing and defending the 
distinction, and citing other scholars who support it). 
9. Simon, supra note l, at 1089-90; see also DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN 
ETHICAL STUDY 160-61 (1988) (maintaining that lawyers should "dissociate themselves from 
projects that are immoral"). Simon divides his general thesis into two subtheses: (1) that law-
yers should deny advice when the merits of a potential client's claims and goals are low relative 
to other potential clients, Simon, supra note 1, at 1091-96; and (2) that lawyers should endeavor 
"to achieve the most appropriate resolution in each case." Id. at 1096, 1096-113. 
10. Simon, supra note 1, at 1084, 1132-33; see also id. at 1094, 1096 (stating that the law firm 
has a "professional duty" to consider the relative merits of cases before taking them and that his 
approach "requires" lawyers to try to reach the best result in each case). David Luban states 
that he "has no objection" to incorporating such a requirement into professional canons but 
ultimately declines to decide "whether a rule should require or merely permit a lawyer to forego 
morally objectionable tactics." LUBAN, supra note 9, at 158. 
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Federal Rules of Civil Procedure move beyond the "knowing assist-
ance" framework to permit imposition of sanctions on a lawyer who 
innocently files an action wholly lacking in merit if reasonable prefiling 
inquiry would have disclosed that lack of merit. 11 This modification 
clearly moves the standard for providing litigation advice closer to the 
sort of contextual judgment envisioned by Simon. 
More recently, the highly publicized series of enforcement pro-
ceedings brought by the Office of Thrift Supervision against the Kaye, 
Scholer law firm featured versions of both categorical and situational 
approaches. Thus, the Office of Thrift Supervision took the position 
that lawyers giving compliance advice to federally chartered savings 
and loans should practice the "whole law." This doctrine requires 
lawyers to investigate client activities that appear to be of doubtful 
legality and to refuse advice that would frustrate the purposes of regu-
lation even when there is a serious technical argument that the clienes 
conduct is not sanctionable. 12 Each of these requirements represents 
an important step toward a contextual duty to deny advice. Kaye, 
Scholer's abortive defense, in contrast, relied heavily on a categorical 
distinction between litigation and nonlitigation advice. Because it had 
been retained solely as litigation counsel, Kaye, Scholer argued, it was 
wholly inappropriate, as a matter of both precedent and policy, to ap-
ply any ethical standard more demanding than the normal prohibition 
on the presentation of frivolous or knowingly false legal and factual 
claims. 13 
Although generally limited to legal advice, the above analyses and 
regulatory proposals bear on a more fundamental question: whether 
and when knowledge about legal sanctions is desirable. They can thus 
be linked to what might seem an unrelated line of reasoning: Meir 
Dan-Cohen's pathbreaking jurisprudential analysis of "acoustic sepa-
ration" in criminal law.14 According to Dan-Cohen, criminal law 
often transmits "conduct rules" to the public that are harsher than the 
11. FED. R. C1v. P. 11. The former rule permitted the imposition of sanctions solely on a 
showing of subjective "bad faith." See FED. R. C1v. P. 11 advisory committee notes (1983 
amendments). The new proposed amendments to the rule retain the rule of reason standard. See 
FED. R. C1v. P. 11 (proposed amendments). 
12. See Advice on How To Exploit Ethical Loopholes May Be Unethical, OTS' Weinstein Says, 
56 BNA Banking Rep. (BNA) 616, 616 (Apr. 1, 1991) (reporting remarks of the General Coun· 
sel of OTS), available in LEXIS, BNA Library, BNABNK File. 
13. Memorandum from Kaye, Scholer Executive Committee to All Kaye, Scholer Personnel 
(Mar. 2, 1992), cited in Wilkins, supra note 8, at 1148 & n.4, 1156 [hereinafter Memorandum]. 
14. See Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation In 
Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625 (1984). We stress that Dan-Cohen would not himself view 
the topics of legal advice and acoustic separation as unrelated. Id. at 677 & n.148 (noting his 
decision to leave unexplored the "complex and crucial role played by lawyers in regard to acous-
tic separation"). 
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actual "decision rules" used to adjudicate cases. This "selective trans-
mission," which can only work under conditions of partial "acoustic 
separation" between what adjudicators say and what the public hears, 
prevents individuals from accurately assessing true legal sanctions. 
But, Dan-Cohen demonstrates, such selective transmission can dis-
courage bad behavior (because individuals think the law is harsh) 
without producing the actual injustice that might arise from imposing 
harsh legal standards. 
Ironically, the dictum that "ignorance of the law is no excuse" it-
self illustrates selective transmission because, despite the widespread 
dissemination of this maxim to the public, ignorance of the law often is 
a permissible defense in actual adjudication.15 The divergence be-
tween the maxim and reality is a form of selective transmission that 
encourages individuals to learn the law, which improves their behav-
ior, but avoids any injustice that would arise from punishing unin-
formed individuals for conduct they reasonably believed was lawful. 
Although Dan-Cohen does not extend his analysis beyond the se-
lective transmission of substantive criminal law defenses and limita-
tions, it can readily be extended to other criminal law issues and to 
civil law as well. Moreover, although Dan-Cohen does not discuss 
curbs on legal advice as such, such curbs could, within his framework, 
be regarded as a strategy of selective transmission. Indeed, because 
legal advice tends to eliminate acoustic separation, such restrictions 
may often be essential to implementing any selective transmission 
strategy. But Dan-Cohen's analysis reminds us that restricting legal 
advice is only one of many methods by which the legal regime might 
try to diminish the legal knowledge possessed by the general public. 
Against the backdrop of these analyses, we aim to offer a more 
systematic account of whether and when knowledge about legal sanc-
tions, and restrictions on the dissemination or use of such knowledge, 
are socially desirable. Because it bears critically on our conclusions, 
we begin in Part I by developing the point that, even in an optimal 
sanctioning regime, sanctions are inevitably imprecise. Moreover, this 
imprecision takes multiple forms involving similar trade-offs. The 
scope of conduct subject to sanctions will necessarily be over- and un-
derinclusive, including some desirable behavior while failing to include 
some undesirable behavior. And the level of sanctions will necessarily 
result in some overdeterrence of desirable behavior and some un-
derdeterrence of undesirable behavior. 
Accordingly, even when sanctions are optimal, accurate advice 
15. Id. at 645-48. 
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about legal sanctions has many adverse effects. However, we conclude 
in Part II that, absent a skewed distribution of legal ignorance, the 
overall behavioral consequences of advice about sanctions will tend to 
be desirable if society bas set sanctions to optimize behavior. We also 
conclude that this proposition applies just as readily to advice about 
sanctions for litigation conduct as to advice about sanctions for pri-
mary conduct. In reaching these conclusions, we reject various cate-
gorical distinctions developed in Shavell's analysis of primary conduct 
advice. We also reject any categorical distinction between the social 
desirability of advice given prior to litigation and that given during 
litigation, whether that distinction favors advice about primary con-
duct, as in the work of Kaplow and Shavell, or litigation advice, as in 
the work of Fuller and his followers. 
We then apply our analysis in Part III to the question whether a 
noncategorical or case-by-case approach should be used to restrict 
"undesirable advice" - that is, advice that, in the given situation, will 
lead to undesirable results. We conclude that fairness arguments 
might sometimes justify legal advice about sanctions even where such 
advice has adverse behavioral consequences. More fundamentally, we 
conclude that Simon's noncategorical approach fails to recognize that, 
like any other rule, a rule banning undesirable advice will raise 
overdeterrence problems. Because resolution of whether advice was 
undesirable will often be inaccurate, such a ban will deter lawyers 
from giving some advice that would have had desirable results. More-
over, this overdeterrence is likely to be especially severe for clients 
who are poor, unsophisticated, or have one-shot or low-stakes claims. 
The total mix of over- and underdeterrence might well be worse than 
under a categorical approach. 
Nor is the question necessarily different in kind if Simon's pro-
posed rule is taken to define only a social or ethical norm without legal 
force. Although detection and application may well be easier under a 
social or ethical norm, it will never be perfect, and whatever means are 
used to resolve questions about the norm's application will also be sus-
ceptible to error and, via social sanctions or the internalization of 
moral norms, over- and underdeterrence. Further, we show that, 
through the crime-fraud exception, current law actually uses a noncat-
egorical metastandard to trigger either a categorical or noncategorical 
approach. Such a triggering approach, we argue, can optimize over-
and underdeterrence better than any unitary rule or standard could. 
Finally, we use our analysis in Part IV to generalize and extend 
Dan-Cohen's analysis to a more global issue: whether and when the 
law should restrict the dissemination of legal knowledge, whether by 
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restricting legal advice or through other means, based on the topic of 
the knowledge communicated. Under some circumstances, such selec-
tive transmission about imperfect sanctions may lead to desirable 
behavior. But, even when sanctions are nonoptimal, selective trans-
mission can also produce undesirable behavior. We identify the cir-
cumstances that will make selective transmission behaviorally 
desirable or undesirable. We further argue that, given these circum-
stances, no grounds exist to conclude that advice or knowledge about 
legal sanctions is in general behaviorally undesirable even when sanc-
tions, if fully known, would not optimize behavior. The desirability of 
such advice depends instead on evidence about what particular over-
or underestimations of legal sanctions unadvised or ignorant parties 
would make given the topic at hand. Moreover, many selec_tive trans-
mission strategies are subject to serious fairness objections. When, as 
often, selective transmission has ambiguous behavioral effects, fairness 
concerns will normally dictate rejecting such strategies. Even when 
selective transmission clearly improves behavior, fairness objections 
will in some cases provide a basis for forgoing the strategy. 
I. THE UNA VOIDABLE TRADE-OFF IN OPTIMAL LEGAL 
SANCTIONS 
Legal sanctions are inevitably imperfect. This, by itself, may seem 
obvious. Perfection is not to be had by mere mortals. And perhaps it 
is found less often in law than in other human endeavors. But the 
point here is deeper. Even behaviorally optimal sanctions will be im-
precise because punishing (and thus deterring) undesirable behavior 
can only be accomplished at the price of punishing (and thus deter-
ring) some desirable behavior. At some point, efforts to ameliorate the 
underpunishment (and underdeterrence) of undesirable behavior will 
raise the punishment (and overdeterrence) of desirable behavior to un-
acceptable levels. Hence, behaviorally optimal sanction regimes can, 
even in theory, achieve no greater perfection than reaching the optimal 
trade-off between the underdeterrence of undesirable behavior and the 
overdeterrence of desirable behavior. 
Sanctioning regimes can be expected to pursue multiple strategies 
to achieve this behavioral optimization. Adjusting the level of sanc-
tions is one strategy; adjusting the burden of proof or the scope of 
sanctionable conduct are other strategies. The pursuit of these multi-
ple strategies means that we cannot assume that the communication of 
accurate information about the probability and magnitude of even op-
timal sanctions will improve behavior. Nor can we assume that all 
legal (or unsanctionable) conduct is desirable under an optimal regime 
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or that lowering the actual level of optimal sanctions (for past or con-
templated conduct) is undesirable. 
All of this deserves particular emphasis here because leading anal-
yses of legal advice have adopted contrary premises. In his seminal 
economic analysis of legal counseling, for example, Shavell assumed 
that all unsanctionable conduct is desirable; further, he indirectly as-
sumed that a regime of appropriate sanctions would deter all undesir-
able conduct but never deter desirable conduct.16 In later writings, 
Kaplow and Shaven used this assumed baseline of appropriate sanc-
tions to draw their sharp contrast between legal counseling advice and 
litigation advice. 17 Simon makes a similar error in failing to recognize 
that the proposals he makes for reducing undesirable advice will inevi-
tably deter and reduce desirable advice as well. 18 
A. The Root Problem of Incomplete Information 
Whatever criteria society uses to distinguish desirable from unde-
sirable conduct, 19 it faces the problem that any regime of legal sanc-
tions will be imprecise because of incomplete information. Perfect 
sanctioning would require complete information supplied by reliable 
witnesses.20 But not all information can be observed. For example, 
even a reliable witness to the conduct in controversy usually cannot 
directly observe the actor's state of mind or internal physical condi-
tion. Even when physically possible, direct observation may involve 
prohibitive costs. Many acts must be observed, and reliable witnesses 
are expensive, in large part because a cumbersome system of secon-
dary sanctions is often necessary to ensure their reliability.21 
16. For a discussion of these and other articles, see infra section II.A. 
17. For further discussion, see infra section II.A. 
18. For further discussion, see infra section IIl.B. 
19. Our analysis makes no assumption about what these criteria should be. In particular, we 
do not choose between the welfarist view that conduct is undesirable if and only if it causes harm 
exceeding the actor's gain, Shaven, supra note 4, at 128-29, and the view that at least some 
conduct is undesirable because it is intrinsically wrong rather than because it fails a utilitarian 
calculus. Cf. Alvin K. Klevorick, On the Economic Theory of Crime, in NOMOS XXVII: CRIMI-
NAL JUSTICE 289, 293-94 (J. Ruland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1985) (questioning 
whether an act's utility to a criminal offender should be taken into account in determining the 
social value of her conduct). 
20. A reliable witness is physically and mentally competent, skilled in observation, knowl-
edgeable about the subject matter being observed, and disinterested. 
21. Massive videotaping of all human activity might avoid some of the problems raised by 
secondary sanctioning systems, but it would entail its own enormous financial costs. It would 
undoubtedly also require human monitors to process the resulting videotapes, which in turn 
requires some secondary sanctioning system to ensure the reliability of videotape monitors. Of 
course, it would involve other enormous costs in terms of desirable conduct deterred, invasion of 
privacy, and general spiritual impoverishment, as the text following this footnote indicates. The 
patent grotesqueness of the suggestion is itself evidence that a society may find that other goods 
provide ample compensation for the imprecision of its sanctioning system. 
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But some of the most significant costs of collecting information are 
not financial. Surveillance is often intrinsically harmful insofar as it 
invades privacy or restricts personal liberty. Moreover, the observa-
tion needed to distinguish desirable from undesirable conduct can it-
self have the perverse effect of deterring desirable conduct. For 
example, observing the industrial design process may detect defective 
designs but discourage technical innovation (which might even im-
prove safety) because of the risk that trade secrets would be disclosed. 
Close observation of family interaction may detect child abuse but de-
stroy the intimacy and spontaneity that are among the principal goods 
of family life. At some point, concerns about these nonfinancial costs 
of surveillance justify placing limits, such as evidentiary privileges, on 
the ability of reliable witnesses to observe or report disputed conduct. 
In short, obtaining reliable, complete information is not only un-
feasible but undesirable. Hence, even in an ideal legal system, tribu-
nals would have incomplete information and thus encounter difficulty 
determining with confidence whether a party has engaged in desirable 
or undesirable conduct. In a more realistic world, tribunals will (even 
if conscientious) also make errors in assessing the presented informa-
tion or determining whether that information evidences undesirable 
conduct under the existing law.22 As a result, any legal regime will 
make two kinds of errors: (1) failing to detect and punish some unde-
sirable conduct; and (2) mistakenly punishing some desirable conduct. 
B. The Three Basic Strategies for Optimizing Sanctions 
Legal regimes employ various strategies to address this unavoida-
ble imprecision. All, however, share a common problem. In the ab-
sence of the information necessary to distinguish with certainty 
between desirable and undesirable conduct, the strategies can improve 
the sanctioning and deterrence of undesirable conduct only at the cost 
of sanctioning and deterring desirable conduct. 
Before describing these strategies, it is worth addressing a basic 
objection to the analysis: namely that not all conduct can be described 
as desirable or undesirable. On many subjects, one might argue (and 
we would agree), the proper stance of the legal regime is agnosticism 
because individuals ought to have the autonomy to choose what they 
want to do. There is, however, no difficulty in incorporating this ob-
servation into the general framework of this article. Where society 
22. Sometimes the law will itself be vague in defining undesirable conduct. This effectively 
gives tribunals lawmaking discretion to define undesirable conduct. Because they will sometimes 
exercise this discretion in ways that deviate from what society would wish, this is another source 
of legal error. 
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values the freedom to do as one sees fit, any conduct individuals 
choose is socially desirable in the sense used here because it would be 
undesirable to deter individuals from choosing that conduct freely. 
The legal regime can overdeter conduct that furthers autonomy as 
well as conduct that furthers other social values. 
1. Probabilistic Standards of Proof 
One strategy for coping with uncertainty about what conduct is 
undesirable is to have tribunals determine on a case-by-case basis the 
probability that any given conduct was undesirable and then apply 
sanctions when that probability exceeds a certain threshold. The legal 
regime might, for example, define sanctionable conduct in terms of 
characteristics that strongly correlate with desirability but could only 
be reliably established with information that is impossible or too costly 
to obtain. 
For example, consider a rule that conditions sanctions on a party's 
subjective good faith or intent. Under such a rule, adjudication of 
whether the sanctionable conduct occurred must rest either on partial 
information or on information of low reliability, such as the testimony 
of the interested parties. Such adjudication will inevitably be rough 
and uncertain, turning on the tribunal's extrapolation from existing 
facts, its assessment of the witnesses' general propensity to lie or for-
get, their incentives and opportunity to lie in the particular case, and 
so forth. 
Tribunals might then accommodate the resulting uncertainty by 
demanding only proof that the probability that the sanctionable con-
duct occurred meets a certain threshold. But the lower the probability 
needed to punish undesirable conduct, the more that inaccurate adju-
dication will punish and deter desirable conduct. The higher the 
probability, the more undesirable conduct will go unpunished and 
underdeterred. An optimal probability will leave some desirable con-
duct punished and overdeterred and some undesirable conduct unpun-
ished and underdeterred. 23 
If the underdeterrence of undesirable conduct becomes worrisome, 
the legal regime may lower the standard of proof to punish a greater 
23. See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Adminis-
tration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399, 410-15 (1973); see also Thomas J. Miceli, Optimal Prosecution of 
Defendants Whose Guilt Is Uncertain, 6 J.L. EcoN. & Ono. 189, 196-97 (1990). The appropriate 
standard of proof, and the degree of over- and undersanctioning, will also depend on the levels of 
litigation efforts by prosecutors, see id. at 189-90, 195-96, 200-01, and defendants. See Daniel L. 
Rubinfeld & David E.M. Sappington, Efficient Awards and Standards of Proof in Judicial Pro-
ceedings, 18 RAND J. EcoN. 308 (1987). But adjustments in, or based on, litigation efforts can-
not eliminate the over- and undersanctioning problem. 
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percentage of undesirable acts. The regime might, for example, re-
quire proof of negligence instead of scienter to establish fraud in solic-
iting proxies. Or the regime might change the standard of proof 
indirectly (for example, by making a penalty civil instead of criminal) 
or de facto rather than de jure (for example, by appointing judges who 
are less sympathetic to defendants). All these types of adjustments 
have been tried. 
But any adjustment has trade-offs. A lower standard of proof 
reduces underdeterrence but results in greater overdeterrence of desir-
able acts. Federal proxy regulation is illustrative: it now stands ac-
cused of reducing fraudulent proxy solicitations at the cost of 
discouraging any communication among shareholders at all. 24 A 
higher standard of proof, on the other hand, would ameliorate this 
overdeterrence of desirable communications but would result in 
greater underdeterrence of undesirable fraud. 
2. Bright-Line Rules 
Alternatively, the regime can define sanctionable conduct using 
criteria that can be observed at a low cost and with a high degree of 
confidence.25 Instead of defining sanctionable conduct in terms of the 
party's state of mind or other difficult to observe information, the re-
gime may define it in terms that expressly disclaim reliance on state of 
mind or allow proof based on easily observable features of the parties' 
conduct. Examples include the objective theory of contract, the stat-
ute of frauds, various per se rules of liability under section 1 of the 
Sherman Act, 26 and the securities law prohibition on short-swing trad-
ing by statutory insiders whether or not they possess inside 
24. See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520, 
539-40 (1990); John Pound, Proxy Voting and the SEC: Investor Protection Versus Market Effi-
ciency, 29 J. FIN. EcoN. 241, 242, 271 (1991). 
25. See Issac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 257 (1974); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 
89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1687-1701 (1976). For our purposes, the' key difference between rules 
and standards is that the former rely on criteria that are easy to detect and apply whereas the 
latter rely on criteria that are harder to detect and apply but are more closely correlated to the 
desirability of the underlying conduct. Our definition thus parallels Ehrlich and Posner's but 
differs from that used by others, who distinguish rules from standards based on whether their 
content is set ex ante or ex post, see Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analy-
sis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 560 (1992), or whether they are simple or detailed. Id. at 560 n.4 (collect-
ing sources). It seems to us that we often have ex ante standards (for example, the antitrust rule 
of reason) as well as rules, and that we could have ex post versions of either. Similarly, rules can 
be simple (speed limits) or complex (the tax code), and standards can be complex (15-factor 
balancing tests) or simple (intentional battery). 
26. Act of July 2, 1890, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 
(1988)). 
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information. 27 
Detecting and punishing a violation of such bright-line rules will 
be easier.28 However, because such rules use criteria that correlate less 
well with the desirability of the underlying conduct, the defined scope 
of sanctionable conduct will be over- or underinclusive.29 Either some 
desirable conduct will be defined as sanctionable or some undesirable 
conduct will not. In all likelihood, both will be true. 
As compared with the first strategy, such a bright-line strategy 
reduces uncertainty about the applicability of sanctions. 30 This strat-
egy will therefore deter parties less from engaging in conduct that lies 
outside the scope of the defined sanctionable conduct, but which might 
be mistaken for it. But, to the extent that nonsanctionable conduct 
under the bright-line rule encompasses undesirable as well as desirable 
conduct, it is not clear that this lessening of deterrence will always be 
socially beneficial. It may encourage "the proverbial 'bad man' to 
'walk the line'" and thus exploit the resulting loopholes.31 
If the nonsanctionable conduct encompasses only desirable con-
duct, this lessened deterrence will, standing alone, be desirable. But 
obtaining this social benefit has a cost: the deterrence of desirable con-
duct within the scope of sanctionable conduct will increase. There are 
two reasons for this. First, punishment of desirable conduct within 
the bright-line rule will be more certain than if a standard applied. 
Second, if under the rule all nonsanctionable conduct is desirable, then 
the rule must by definition include all undesirable acts. Designing 
such a broad rule is almost sure to increase the rule's overinclusion of 
desirable conduct. 
3. Adjusting Penalties 
The limitations of these two basic approaches to identifying sanc-
tionable conduct also infect strategies that involve adjusting the level 
27. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, § 16(b), 48 Stat. 881 (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78(a)-(l/) (1988)). 
28. Moreover, individuals generally have more incentive to learn about, and thus have their 
behavior influenced by, rules rather than standards for two reasons. First, individuals benefit 
more from learning about rules because they offer more precise predictions of adjudication than 
standards do. Second, to the extent rules are easier to learn, the cost of learning them will be 
lower. Cf Kaplow, supra note 25, at 571-72 (using different definition of rules and standards). 
This second factor, however, may not always hold. Learning the standard of negligence, for 
example, seems easier and less costly than learning some provisions of the tax code. 
29. See John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance with 
Legal Standards, 70 VA. L. REV. 965, 1000 (1984); Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 25, at 268; 
Kennedy, supra note 25, at 1689-90; see also United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 
U.S. 422, 442 n.17 (1978) (recognizing that per se rules increase deterrence of desirable conduct). 
30. See Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 25, at 261-64; Kennedy, supra note 25, at 1688-89. 
31. Kennedy, supra note 25, at 1696. 
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of actual penalties imposed. For example, a classic strategy for ad-
dressing the underdeterrence that results from imperfect information 
is to increase the penalties imposed on those determined to engage in 
undesirable conduct to reflect the probability that they might have es-
caped detection and punishment. 32 If, for example, only one-third of 
antitrust violations are detected and punished, then trebling damages 
will produce the same expected sanction as single damages and one 
hundred percent detection and punishment. Assuming the actual pen-
alties imposed can be set high enough, then, despite infrequent punish-
ment, expected sanctions can outweigh the benefits of (and thus deter) 
undesirable conduct. 
An initial problem with this strategy is that the legal regime cannot 
always set penalties high enough to eliminate underdeterrence. If the 
frequency of detection and punishment is low, it may be impossible to 
raise sanctions sufficiently to deter all undesirable conduct. Or the 
level of sanctions required to eliminate underdeterrence may be dis-
proportionate, unfair, cruel, beyond individual actors' wealth (so that 
increasing sanctions yields no additional deterrent benefit), or, in the 
case of extensive incarceration, too costly to administer. 33 
A more general problem is that adjusting penalties can eliminate 
underdeterrence only at the cost of increasing overdeterrence. 34 If, 
given incomplete information, either the definition of sanctionable 
conduct or the uncertainties of its adjudication often subject desirable 
conduct to a risk of sanctions, then an increase in penalties to increase 
deterrence of undesirable conduct will increase deterrence of desirable 
conduct as well. 35 If, to avoid this result, the legal regime defines or 
32. See, e.g., JEREMY BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 325-26 (C.K. Ogden ed. & 
Richard Hildreth trans., Harcourt Brace & Co. 1931) (1789); A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN 
INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND EcONOMICS 75-86 (2d ed. 1989); Gary s. Becker, Crime and 
Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. PoL. EcoN. 169, 183-85 (1968); Jeffrey S. Parker, The 
Economics of Mens Rea, 79 VA. L. REV. 741, 748-54 (1993) (collecting sources). 
33. See Stephen McG. Bundy & Einer R. Elhauge, Do Lawyers Improve the Adversary Sys-
tem? A General Theory of Litigation Advice and Its Regulation, 79 CAL. L. REV. 313, 390-91 
(1991); Reinier K. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement Strat-
egy, 2 J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 53, 56-57 (1986). 
34. When economists describe "overdeterrence," they generally focus on the consumption of 
social resources in preventing an offense, see Parker, supra note 32, at 757 n.46, such as the 
expenditure of money on enforcement and punishment efforts. See id. at 750-53. Our focus, 
however, will be on the deterrence of desirable behavior caused as an incident of efforts to deter 
undesirable behavior. 
35. See Calfee & Craswell, supra note 29, at 995-97. Risk aversion will heighten the in-
creased overdeterrence because high sanctions with a low probability of application impose 
greater risk-bearing costs than low sanctions with a higher probability. See A. Mitchell Polinsky 
& Steven Shaven, The Optimal Tradeojf Between the Probability and Magnitude of Fines, 69 AM. 
EcoN. REV. 880 (1979). Of course, to the extent undesirable actors are also risk averse, risk 
aversion will tend to reduce underdeterrence as well, but one might expect risk-bearing costs to 
be more significant for desirable actors because their probability of punishment will be lower. 
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adjudicates sanctionable conduct in a way that eliminates the punish-
ment and deterrence of desirable conduct, then some undesirable con-
duct will also remain effectively unpunished and undeterred no matter 
how much penalties are increased. 
4. Individual Variation 
The three recognized strategies also face problems of over- and un-
dersanctioning that result from individual variation. Actors differ in 
the benefits that they receive from the same conduct. In part, this 
depends on whether they share any societal belief that a given act is 
desirable or undesirable. It may also reflect the degree to which they 
fear extralegal sanctions, such as divine punishment, the reproach of 
conscience, or damage to their reputation, relationships, or future eco-
nomic opportunities. 36 Actors also differ in their aversion to risk, 
their perceptions of expected sanctions, and their ability and willing-
ness to engage in rational calculation. 
Such individual variation implies that a uniform schedule of ex-
pected sanctions will have different effects on different actors. Tribu-
nals may attempt to adjust the actual sanctions imposed to 
compensate for this variation. However, such ad hoc, individualized 
efforts are likely to suffer from considerable imprecision because the 
preferences, beliefs, and character traits involved are difficult to iden-
tify with confidence. 37 Where individualized sanction adjustments are 
infeasible, the optimal expected sanctions will depend on the mix of 
characteristics in the regulated population. Optimal sanctions will 
have to minimize under- and oversanctioning given the population's 
mix of characteristics and will thus underdeter undesirable acts or 
overdeter desirable acts by persons who are unusual in any of the 
above respects. 
Actors vary not only in their response to legal regulation generally, 
but also in their response to the choice of particular sanctioning strate-
gies. Like most rational actor accounts of legal advice, our baseline 
account assumes that actors are sanction optimizers. In deciding 
whether to engage in regulated conduct, the sanction optimizer is a 
Holmesian "bad man"38 who considers only the actual level of ex-
36. See, e.g., Parker, supra note 32, at 755 & n.38 (collecting sources). 
37. See generally Bundy & Elhauge, supra note 33, at 390 (discussing problems of adjusting 
sanctions given individual variation); Kaplow & Shavell, Legal Advice About Information, supra 
note 4, at 591-93. 
38. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 
167, 171 (1921) (introducing the "bad man"). 
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pected legal sanctions and gives no independent weight to the fact that 
the conduct is legally prohibited or required. 
Other actors, however, may respond more to the sanctionability of 
conduct than to the level of expected sanctions. Such actors, whom 
we characterize as "law abiding," tend to comply with what they un-
derstand to be their legal obligations regardless of the level of expected 
sanctions for failing to do so. 39 For example, if the law forbids certain 
conduct outright, as does much of the criminal law, the law abider will 
not engage in it no matter how low the expected sanction. If the law 
permits conduct conditional on compensation for harm caused, as in 
much of tort and contract law, the law abider will wish to pay the full 
harm caused, whether or not he expects victims to sue or, if suit is 
brought, to prevail. 
A population of actors that is generally law abiding may influence 
the mix of sanctioning strategies used by allowing the designers of the 
regime to focus on the definition of sanctionability rather than on the 
level of expected sanctions. Such a population, however, does not nec-
essarily eliminate problems of over- and underdeterrence because, to 
the extent that law abiders respond simply to the fact that conduct is 
sanctionable, they will comply whether or not the definition of sanc-
tionable conduct comports with social desirability.40 
C. Compensatory Subsidies: A Fourth Basic Strategy? 
In addition to the three recognized strategies, LP.L. Png has sug-
gested an ingenious fourth strategy for coping with legal error: coup-
ling an adjustment in penalties with a general subsidy for all actors. 41 
Under this strategy, the legal regime would first increase penalties to 
39. Law abidingness is independent of the content of the particular law and its congruence 
with the actor's own views of morality. Rather it represents the actor's tendency to comply with 
the law simply because it is the law. We need not take a position here on whether this tendency 
is most appropriately viewed as a preference or as an expression of a kind of practical reason 
different from economic maximization. See Lewis Kornhauser, Are There Cracks in the Founda-
tions of Spontaneous Order?, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 647, 670-72 (1992) (reviewing ROBERT C. 
ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991)). 
40. If all actors were uniformly perfectly law abiding, then the regime could define conduct 
as sanctionable strictly in accord with its social desirability. Disputes would still arise about 
whether particular conduct was sanctionable because of good faith disagreements about the facts 
and the scope of sanctionability, and some of those disputes would be resolved erroneously. But 
imperfections in detection and adjudication resulting from the definition of sanctionability would 
not lead to over- or underdeterrence because they would not figure in compliance decisions even 
if known. Indeed, adjudication would have no deterrence function at all. 
But of course not all actors are perfect law abiders. As long as a substantial set of actors 
respond to expected sanctions rather than sanctionability, the regime that wishes to optimize 
behavior is likely to adopt a definition of sanctionability that does not correspond precisely to 
social desirability for all the reasons stated above. 
41. See generally I.P.L. Png, Optimal Subsidies and Damages in the Presence of Judicial Er-
ror, 6 INTL. REV. L. & EcON. 101 (1986). We are indebted to Dan Rubinfeld for pointing out 
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offset underdeterrence until the difference between the expected penal-
ties for undesirable and desirable conduct equals the harm from acting 
undesirably. Then the legal regime would compensate for the ex-
pected penalties imposed on those acting desirably by giving all actors 
(desirable and undesirable alike) a subsidy sufficient to offset this 
overdeterrence effect. Png's strategy thus offers the promise of elimi-
nating both the overdeterrence of desirable conduct and the under-
deterrence of undesirable conduct despite the legal regime's imperfect 
ability to distinguish them. 
An example might help. Suppose we wish to deter negligent driv-
ing but not non-negligent driving. Suppose further that all accidents 
give rise to claims and that, for a given accident, we can determine 
with eighty percent accuracy whether or not the driver was negligent. 
The actual penalty imposed on those judged to be negligent is $5000. 
The expected penalty needed to deter all negligent driving is also 
$5000. Under this regime, the expected penalty for driving negligently 
is $4000 because twenty percent of those who drive negligently escape 
punishment. The expected penalty for driving non-negligently is 
$1000 because twenty percent of non-negligent drivers are mistakenly 
found liable. Non-negligent driving would thus be overdeterred while 
negligent driving would remain underdeterred. To compensate for the 
underdeterrence, we might increase the penalty to $6250. That would 
produce an expected penalty for negligent driving of $5000, sufficient 
to eliminate underdeterrence. But the expected penalty for non-negli-
gent driving would also increase, from $1000 to $1250, thus exacerbat-
ing overdeterrence. We seem to face a familiar trade-off. 
Png's proposed solution to this dilemma has two elements. First, 
he would increase the actual penalty even further until the difference 
between the expected penalties for negligent and non-negligent driving 
equals $5000. Here the necessary penalty would be $8333.33. That 
would make the expected penalty for negligent driving equal to 
$6666.66 and the expected penalty for non-negligent driving $1666.66. 
Second, Png would give all drivers a subsidy of $1666.66 for driving. 
The result is that the negligent driver would face an expected cost of 
$5000 - the $6,666.66 expected penalty minus the $1666.66 subsidy 
- which is enough to deter all negligent driving. The non-negligent 
driver would face an expected cost of zero dollars, because the subsidy 
offsets the expected penalty. Overdeterrence is thus also seemingly 
eliminated, at least if one puts aside risk aversion. 
that we have to address Png's strategy to establish our claim that the tradeoff between over- and 
underdeterrence is inevitable. 
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Professor Png's strategy is undeniably ingenious. Moreover, it 
seems largely unappreciated in the legal literature. For several rea-
sons, however, we do not believe that Png's strategy undermines our 
general conclusion that no legal regime can ever avoid the trade-off 
between over- and underdeterrence. 42 
To begin with, Png's reasoning depends on an isolated analysis of a 
single activity: driving. If the legal regime actually tried to pursue his 
strategy across the board to curb all forms of undesirable conduct 
without deterring desirable conduct, it would end up subsidizing all 
activities. Subsidies would be required not just for driving, but for 
skiing, flying, bus riding, or any other activity that might be penalized 
if performed undesirably. The subsidization used to encourage these 
socially optimal levels of driving will thus be undermined by the subsi-
dization used to encourage socially optimal alternatives. What mat-
ters is not the absolute subsidy given to drivers but the relative subsidy 
between alternative activities. Png's strategy does not explain how 
subsidies can produce perfectly efficient choices between desirable and 
undesirable versions of a given activity without skewing choices 
among different desirable activities. 
A related problem is that Png's analysis assumes parties should 
internalize only the physical harm caused by their activities. 43 But 
activities would also impose another cost under a legal regime that 
employed his strategy: namely the cost of the subsidies that society 
must supply to offset the difficulty of distinguishing between desirable 
and undesirable versions of that activity. Let us call these costs impre-
cision costs. Because the level of difficulty involved in distinguishing 
between desirable and undesirable acts differs for different types of ac-
tivities, some activities will produce higher levels of imprecision costs 
than others. Under Png's strategy, however, no activity would be 
forced to internalize its imprecision costs. It is not clear why this 
should be desirable. One might instead think that providing the incen-
tives to encourage socially efficient choices between different activities 
would require forcing every activity to include all the costs - includ-
ing the imprecision costs - entailed by that activity. Implicitly, that 
is precisely what a sanctioning regime without subsidies does. 
Further, Png's analysis seems to assume that the collection and 
distribution of taxes and subsidies is costless. Taxes, however, pro-
42. It should be noted that Png himself makes no such grandiose claims for his strategy: our 
concern here is with the implications that might be drawn from his strategy. 
43. Png, supra note 41, at 103. Png also assumes that the private benefit from any activity 
equals the social benefit. If the private benefits are greater or less than the social benefits, his 
conclusions may not follow. 
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duce their own inefficient effects on behavior: for example, they deter 
persons from engaging in those activities subject to taxation. There 
are also substantial direct costs to enforcing taxes, and high costs 
would have to be incurred to determine the size of subsidies, and who 
should receive them, under Png's approach. It is far from clear that 
the social inefficiencies produced by these taxes and subsidies would 
not outweigh any increased efficiency in behavior.44 
Finally, individual variation poses insurmountable problems for 
Png's approach. To implement his approach, the legal regime must 
calculate subsidies. This requires knowing how often each individual 
engages in a particular activity, the probability he would have to pay 
damages if he engages in a desirable version of that activity, and the 
harm he would produce. 45 Because individuals differ on all these mat-
ters, any uniform schedule of subsidies will produce substantial over-
and undersanctioning. If the regime instead calculates different subsi-
dies for each individual, it will need a secondary system of adjudica-
tion to determine how much of a subsidy each individual should 
receive. This secondary system of adjudication would have to contend 
with the same problems of imperfect information that plague the pri-
mary system of adjudication. 
D. Conclusion 
Given imperfect information, the best society can do is to design a 
sanctioning regime that achieves the trade-off between undersanction-
ing undesirable conduct and oversanctioning desirable conduct that 
seems the most optimal. The optimal compromise will most likely en-
tail a combination of strategies: adjudicating or defining sanctionable 
conduct in a way that renders some desirable conduct sanctionable 
while reducing actual sanctions below the level that would be optimal 
if all sanctionable conduct were undesirable. This solution will have 
some adverse effects: optimal expected sanctions will still be high 
enough to deter some desirable acts, but not high enough to deter all 
44. Cf. Richard A. Posner, Taxation by Regulation, 2 BELL J. EcoN. & MGMT. Sci. 22, 41· 
45, 47 (1971) (observing that there is no a priori reason to believe the inefficiencies caused by 
redistributive taxation are lower than the inefficiencies caused by redistributive regulation). If 
the government (rather than private litigants) collects the extra penalties used under the Png 
strategy, this added revenue may help offset the cost of the subsidies. 
45. See Png, supra note 41, at 103. For the particular activity Png analyzed, driving, a con-
venient way of tying the subsidy amount to the activity level would be to subsidize gasoline. 
Alternatively, this might be an argument for not raising the gasoline tax as high as would other-
wise be necessary to offset driving externalities like pollution. But this strategy would not mea· 
sure other activity risk factors, such as when and where the driving occurred, and collecting that 
sort of data might violate privacy or itself deter desirable activity. See supra section I.A. In any 
event, most human activities lack any similar convenient way of metering activity levels. 
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undesirable conduct.46 Given the unavoidable trade-off, however, the 
success of any sanctioning regime cannot fairly be judged by whether 
it wholly eliminates over- or undersanctioning. Rather, it must be 
judged by whether it minimizes the total adverse consequences of un-
dersanctioning undesirable conduct and oversanctioning desirable 
conduct. 
Although this article stresses behavioral measures, such as over-
and underdeterrence, our conclusion does not depend on the measure 
used to evaluate the consequences of under- or oversanctioning. In 
particular, our conclusion is consistent with the view that punishing 
innocent defendants, failing to exact retribution from wrongdoers, or 
inadequately compensating deserving plaintiffs is wrong because it is 
inherently unjust rather than because of its behavioral consequences. 
Under such nonbehavioralist views, the sanctioning regime would sim-
ply aim to minimize the total injustice resulting from over- and under-
sanctioning. The key is not the measure of value but the recognition 
that, under any measure, sanctioning undesirable conduct must be 
traded off against sanctioning desirable conduct. 
II. THE DESIRABILITY OF ADVICE ABOUT SANCTIONS AND THE 
CATEGORICAL APPROACH 
As we describe in more detail below, the desirability oflegal advice 
is sometimes viewed as depending on the category of function it per-
forms. One important view distinguishes between advice that simply 
informs persons of the scope and level of expected sanctions and ad-
vice that assists parties in altering expected sanctions. The most desir-
able category of advice is usually considered to be a~vice that merely 
informs clients about whether certain conduct is illegal. Advice that 
also informs clients about the magnitude of legal penalties and the 
probability they will be imposed is viewed with more suspicion be-
cause legal penalties or enforcement may be insufficient. But the gen-
eral attitude toward such advice is still favorable, on the assumption 
that the object of reform should not be the advice but rather the laws 
that provide insufficient penalties and enforcement. With more appro-
46. Steven Shaven demonstrates that setting the level of sanctions for nonproduction of evi-
dence in this manner may be optimal when the tribunal cannot be sure whether a party is failing 
to produce evidence. See Steven Shaven, Optimal Sanctions and the Incentive To Provide Evi-
dence to Legal Tribunals, 9 INTL. REV. L. & EcoN. 3, 4-S (1989). But the point is clearly more 
general. Whenever tribunals cannot distinguish with certainty between desirable and undesirable 
conduct, then - whether the conduct occurs inside or outside litigation - the sanctioning re-
gime can minimize the total disvalue of undersanctioning undesirable conduct and oversanction-
ing desirable conduct by adjusting not only the level of sanctions, but also, through adjudication 
or definition, the scope of conduct subject to sanctions. 
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priate expected penalties, it is felt, such advice would desirably lead 
persons to comply with the law. 
Under this initial categorical approach, both of the above forms of 
advice - which simply communicate the existing scope and level of 
expected legal penalties - are viewed more favorably than advice that 
gives persons knowledge about how to alter expected legal penalties. 
This latter type of advice, it is felt, helps persons evade their legal 
responsibilities. It does so either by altering the information created 
about contemplated conduct or by altering (typically in litigation) the 
information revealed about past conduct. 
A version of the categorical distinction between advice that in-
forms persons about expected sanctions and advice that alters those 
sanctions appears to underlie what William Simon has described as the 
regulatory approach to legal ethics.47 Under the regulatory approach, 
lawyers should distill and transmit information but should not manip-
ulate that information to further their clients' goals. Recently, an eco-
nomic basis for such an approach - along with a more precise outline 
of its contours - has been spelled out by Kaplow and Shavell in a 
series of articles. 
The point is of more than academic interest. Such a categorical 
distinction may underlie a current rule of professional ethics. Most 
significantly, Model Rule of Professional Conduct Rule l.2{d) states: 
A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in con-
duct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent, but a lawyer may 
discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course of conduct with a 
client and may counsel or assist a client to make a good faith effort to 
determine the validity, scope, meaning or application of the law.48 
The comment to. the rule explains: 
There is a critical distinction between presenting an analysis of legal as-
pects of questionable conduct and recommending the means by which a 
crime or fraud might be committed with impunity .... [T]he lawyer is 
required to avoid furthering the [wrongful] purpose, for example, by sug-
gesting how it might be concealed. 49 
On its face, Rule 1.2 thus seems to make a categorical distinction be-
tween advice that merely informs a client about expected sanctions 
and advice that lowers those expected sanctions. so There are thus live 
47. Simon, supra note 1, at 1085-87. 
48. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(d) (1992). 
49. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2 cmt. (1992). 
50. Unlike the Model Rules, the Model Code of Professional Responsibility does not (at least 
not expressly) draw such a distinction in its crime-fraud exception. See MODEL CODE OF PRO• 
FESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(7) (1980) ("[A] lawyer shall not ... [c]ounsel or assist 
his client in conduct that the lawyer knows to be illegal or fraudulent."). But the relevant Ethi-
cal Considerations under the Code appear to do so. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSI-
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legal issues about whether such a distinction should be recognized 
within the crime-fraud exception and potential legal issues about 
whether the law should extend such a distinction beyond the crime-
fraud area. 
In practice, the posited distinction may break down. If a lawyer 
can tell the party the legal consequences (including the magnitude and 
probability of sanctions) that attend each of a number of possible 
courses of conduct that have the same undesirable purpose, the client 
will have no difficulty choosing the one that results in the lowest ex-
pected sanction.51 But our focus here is less on practical objections to 
possible proposals than on the basic question whether the distinction, 
if definable, is justifiable. 
Another implication of a categorical approach that disfavors ad-
vice that assists a party in altering expected sanctions is that litigation 
advice is particularly suspect; this, of course, is Kaplow and Shavell's 
conclusion. An alternate categorical approach to advice, recently 
characterized by David Wilkins as "the single most important contex-
tual distinction in legal ethics,"52 however, takes a precisely opposite 
tack, viewing litigation advice as categorically more desirable than pri-
mary conduct advice. In litigation, this approach argues, advice is re-
flected primarily in conduct taking place before the tribunal, where 
both parties have legal advice. In contrast, advice about primary con-
duct takes place in private and frequently only the actor has legal ad-
vice. The private and unilateral quality of conduct advice makes it 
unusually dangerous and justifies subjecting it to greater restrictions. 
This claimed categorical distinction also underlies an important 
current debate in professional ethics, a debate that was highlighted in 
the Kaye, Scholer case. Kaye, Scholer represented Lincoln Savings in 
connection with an audit by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board. 
Following its seizure of Lincoln, the Office of Thrift Supervision, the 
Board's successor, brought a widely publicized enforcement proceed-
ing against Kaye, Scholer, charging that it had violated its obligations 
to both Lincoln and the Board, that those violations had contributed 
to delays in closing Lincoln, and that Kaye, Scholer was liable for 
BILITY EC 7-5 (1980) ("A lawyer should never ... counsel his client on how to violate the law 
and avoid punishment therefor."); see also MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 
EC 7-5 n.14 (1980) (quoting ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 281 (1952): 
"There is a sharp distinction, of course, between advising what can lawfully be done and advising 
how unlawful acts can be done in a way to avoid conviction."). See generally CHARLES W. 
WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 13.3.2 (1986). 
51. For a description of how some lawyers accomplish this result, see KENNETH MANN, 
DEFENDING WHITE-COLLAR CRIME: A PORTRAIT OF ATTORNEYS AT WORK 109-11, 115-20 
(1985) (describing compliance advice with respect to government subpoenas). 
52. Wilkins, supra note 8, at 1155. 
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losses resulting from those delays. While some of the government's 
claims may well have been consistent with traditional ethical prohibi-
tions on knowingly assisting in client crime or fraud, others could be 
read as imposing more demanding obligations. sJ 
Kaye, Scholer ultimately settled the claims against it for $41 mil-
lion. What is of interest is that the central element of the firm's de-
fense to the charge was that, "with respect to virtually all of the 
matters at issue, [Kaye, Scholer] was retained as litigation counsel by 
Lincoln."s4 Relying on an opinion from distinguished ethics expert 
Geoffrey Hazard, Kaye, Scholer argued that, given the categorical sta-
tus of its legal work, it would be both unprecedented and unwise to 
impose upon it any of the more demanding standards of conduct im-
plied in the OTS Notice of Charges.ss Subsequent observers of the 
case, while they have criticized Kaye, Scholer's reliance on the distinc-
tion between advice about litigation and advice about primary conduct 
given the facts of the case, largely appear to accept the distinction.s6 
We begin our investigation of these conflicting categorical ap-
proaches by describing in section II.A the Kaplow and Shavell models 
and by taking a critical look at the assumptions needed to reach their 
conclusions. We then demonstrate in section II.B that, with more re-
alistic assumptions, one reaches very different - and often precisely 
opposite - conclusions about categories of legal counseling. Finally, 
in section II.C we tum to categorical distinctions between the social 
desirability of advice in litigation and advice about primary conduct. 
We reject both Kaplow and Shavell's claim that litigation advice is 
categorically inferior to advice about primary conduct and the claim 
by Fuller, Wilkins, and Hazard that the reverse is true. 
A. The Kap/ow and Shavell Models 
In their seminal work in the area, s7 Ka plow and Shavell use eco-
nomic models of legal advice to reach five basic conclusions about 
legal advice. First, "when advice is sought regarding whether acts are 
53. For discussion, see Howell E. Jackson, Reflections on Kaye. Scholer: Enlisting Lawyers 
To Improve the Regulation of Financial Institutions. 66 U.S.C. L. REV. 1019, 1025-32 (1993) 
(outlining tensions between traditional view of lawyers' ethics and OTS's view); Wilkins, supra 
note 8, at 1157-59 (discussing some OTS claims arguably in tension with traditional view). 
54. Memorandum, supra note 13. 
55. See Summary of the Expert Opinion of Geoffrey C Hazard, Jr., reprinted in THE ATIOR-
NEY CLIENT RELATIONSHIP AFrER KAYE, SCHOLER 381, 396 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice 
Course Handbook Series No. 779, 1992) [hereinafter THE ATIORNEY CLIENT RELATIONSHIP]. 
56. Wilkins, supra note 8, at 1183 ("[A]s a general matter, Kaye Scholer's position seems 
uncontroversial."). 
57. See Kaplow & Shaven, Legal Advice About Information, supra note 4; Shaven, supra note 
4. 
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sanctionable, and the advice is definitive, then advice can lead only to 
desirable changes in behavior."58 This conclusion is based on the ob-
servation that, to the extent that it alters behavior, advice about sanc-
tionability will have one of two consequences. Either it will lead 
parties to commit unsanctionable acts that, without advice, they 
would have thought sanctionable, or it will lead them to avoid sanc-
tionable acts that, without advice, they would have thought unsanc-
tionable. 59 Either of those behavioral changes is assumed to be 
socially desirable. 60 
Kaplow and Shavell's second and third conclusions concern legal 
counseling that informs clients about the level of expected legal sanc-
tions. The second conclusion is that "the provision of legal advice 
about the probability and magnitude of sanctions will lead to socially 
desirable changes in behavior if the probability and magnitude of sanc-
tions are set so that expected sanctions equal the harm that results 
from acts."61 The third conclusion is that "the desirability of the ef-
fect of advice about contemplated acts is ambiguous when the legal 
system's sanctions do not properly reflect harm caused."62 Both these 
conclusions are framed in terms of whether expected sanctions equal 
the "harm" caused by the conduct because Shavell's initial model 
adopted the utilitarian assumption that an act is socially undesirable if 
and only if the harm done exceeds the party's gain.63 But Shavell 
stresses that he uses this utilitarian assumption merely to allow him to 
describe an undesirable category of acts, and that his analysis applies 
equally if one uses other criteria for defining undesirable conduct. 64 In 
their subsequent work, Kaplow and Shaven generalize this conclusion 
to assert that advice about the level of expected legal sanctions will 
tend to be socially beneficial if that level is set "appropriately."65 
These generally favorable conclusions about advice that informs 
clients about the scope or level of expected sanctions contrast with 
Kaplow and Shavell's negative conclusions about advice that alters 
those sanctions. Their fourth conclusion is that, "when advice helps 
to lower (rather than only to inform about) the probability or magni-
58. Shaven, supra note 4, at 138 (emphasis added); see also id. at 129. 
59. Id. at 129. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. at 135; see also id. at 138; Kaplow & Shaven, Legal Advice About Information, supra 
note 4, at 597. 
62. Kaplow & Shaven, Legal Advice About Information, supra note 4, at 597 n.77; see also 
Shavell, supra note 4, at 138-39. 
63. Shavell, supra note 4, at 128-29. 
64. Id. at 129 n.16. 
65. Kaplow & Shaven, Legal Advice About Information, supra note 4, at 597. 
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tude of sanctions, advice can lead only to the commission of undesir-
able acts and is therefore undesirable. " 66 (Their models do not 
consider advice that helps raise the level of expected sanctions for 
other parties.) 
Advice in litigation, which helps alter sanctions for past conduct, 
is also viewed as dubious. Kaplow and Shaven observe that eviden-
tiary sanctions are often insufficient to force the revelation of all infor-
mation in a client's possession. 67 They then assume, on the premise 
that this assumption alters the extent but not the nature of their con-
clusions, that lawyers exercise perfect control over the client's infor-
mation. 68 Thus, in their model, litigation advice has only the effect of 
improving the client's selection of information to present to the tribu-
nal from this controlled set of information. Litigation advice should 
accordingly increase the favorable information presented to the tribu-
nal and decrease the unfavorable information presented. 69 Ka plow 
and Shavell therefore conclude that litigation advice lowers the ex-
pected sanctions of those who receive it and has an ambiguous effect 
on the accuracy of adjudication and the behavior of individuals. 70 
Hence their fifth conclusion is that litigation advice, or more generally 
advice about how to challenge or defend past primary conduct, has 
"questionable social value."71 
This chain of reasoning leads to their overall conclusion that there 
exists a sharp contrast between litigation advice and legal counseling 
provided before contemplated primary conduct: 
There is a general reason to believe that legal advice provided when indi-
viduals are deciding how to act will tend to be socially beneficial. Such 
advice informs individuals before they act about the sanctions the legal 
system actually employs. As a result, individuals will be led to behave 
desirably if the level of sanctions is set appropriately .... 
The socially desirable character of legal advice offered ex ante stands 
in sharp contrast to the questionable social value of advice offered during 
66. Shavell, supra note 4, at 139 (emphasis added); see also id. at 137 ("The provision oflegal 
advice that lowers the probability or magnitude of sanctions is socially undesirable because it can 
lead only to an increased number of socially undesirable acts."). 
67. Kaplow & Shaven, Legal Advice About Information, supra note 4, at 571-75. The reason-
ableness of this assumption is, of course, confirmed by scholarly and nonscholarly studies of the 
litigation process. See, e.g., FRANK, supra note 1, at 85-86 (witnesses frequently lie and get away 
with it); Wayne D. Brazil, Views from the Front Lines: Observations by Chicago Lawyers About 
the System of Civil Discovery, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 219, 225 (many civil cases conclude 
with relevant and material information not disclosed). 
68. Kaplow & Shavell, Legal Advice About Information, supra note 4, at 576. 
69. Id. at 568, 577, 581, 595. 
70. Id. at 568-69, 581, 586, 596, 603, 614. 
71. Id. at 597, 614; see also Kaplow & Shaven, Legal Advice About Acts Already Committed, 
supra note 4, at 149. 
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litigation. 72 
We will return to the litigation advice side of this asserted sharp con-
trast in section II.C. For now, let us reexamine the premises underly-
ing the conclusion that advice that merely informs clients about the 
scope and level of expected sanctions is, if those sanctions are "set 
appropriately," desirable. 
The first conclusion regarding advice about the scope of sanctions 
(that is, advice about sanctionability) rests on the premises that caus-
ing parties to commit unsanctionable acts, or to avoid sanctionable 
acts, is by definition desirable. 73 With the benefit of the analysis in 
Part I, it is evident that this first premise is equivalent to assuming that 
the law is never underinclusive: any conduct outside the realm of 
sanctionability is assumed desirable. Kaplow and Shavell's second 
premise is equivalent to assuming the law is never overinclusive or 
overdeterring: any conduct that would be deterred by knowledge of 
its sanctionability is assumed undesirable. Neither of these assump-
tions seems very plausible. 
The premise underlying the conclusions regarding advice about the 
level of expected sanctions (that is, advice about the probability and 
magnitude of sanctions) is that the "appropriate" level of expected 
sanctions equals the harm the conduct causes. We do not wish here to 
quarrel with the utilitarian assumption that the sole measure of social 
desirability is whether the private benefit exceeds the harm to others; 
after all, Kaplow and Shaven state that they adopt this assumption 
solely to define a class of undesirable conduct. 74 Rather the key point 
for present purposes is that, under this definition of undesirability, 
Kaplow and Shavell's notion of the "appropriate" level of expected 
sanctions is perfect in the sense that it will deter every undesirable act 
and no desirable acts. 75 Because an undesirable act is (by definition) 
one that causes more harm to others than gain to the actor, expected 
sanctions equal to that harm will always deter it. Because a desirable 
act is (by definition) one that causes more gain to the actor than harm 
72. Kaplow & Shavell, Legal Advice About Information, supra note 4, at 597 (footnote omit-
ted); see also id. at 614: 
Skepticism about the value of legal advice in litigation is suggested by the manner in 
which it differs from advice provided before people act. The latter type of advice will lead 
individuals to behave more in accord with the law. Advice provided in litigation, after 
individuals have acted, has no similar general tendency. 
73. See supra text accompanying notes 58-60. 
74. See supra text accompanying note 64. 
75. The same can be said for Kaplow and Shavell's definition of the appropriate level of strict 
liability sanctions in Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Private Versus Socially Optimal Provision of 
Ex Ante Legal Advice, 8 J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 306 (1992), which leads them to the conclusion that 
advice about appropriate strict liability sanctions always improves behavior. See id. at 309. 
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to others, expected sanctions equal to that harm will never deter it. 
Under a view that defines undesirable conduct differently, this is 
equivalent to assuming that the regime of "appropriate" sanctions can 
perfectly distinguish between desirable and undesirable conduct. 
It is thus not surprising that, under this assumption, advice that 
informs parties about the level of appropriately set expected sanctions 
is always desirable. Because such sanctions perfectly deter undesirable 
conduct without deterring desirable conduct, no ill can follow from 
disseminating information about such sanctions. Any ill effects that 
actually flowed from advice would thus seem to be the fault of the law 
that "inappropriately" set the level of expected sanctions. Nor is it 
surprising that advice that alters the appropriate level of expected 
sanctions would receive unfavorable reviews. Tampering with perfec-
tion can never constitute an improvement. 
But, given our analysis in Part I, the implicit assumption of perfec-
tion is unrealistic. Because even optimal sanctions cannot perfectly 
distinguish between desirable and undesirable conduct, it makes no 
sense to judge advice using a measure of appropriate sanctions that 
can never be achieved. And the analysis of advice under such an opti-
mal but imperfect regime leads, as we will see in the next section, to 
quite different conclusions about the desirability of such advice. 
B. The Effects of Advice About Optimal but Imperfect Sanctions 
Legal advice about the sanctions applicable to contemplated con-
duct can affect behavior in one of two ways. First, it can correct mis-
perceptions actors may have about expected sanctions. Second, it can 
help actors affect the level of expected sanctions. Because of the vari-
ous inevitable imperfections in any sanctioning regime, either form of 
advice about legal sanctions will have many adverse effects, even when 
sanctions are optimal. Our analysis suggests, however, that their so-
cial desirability is not, overall, that different. Moreover, we conclude 
that, despite these adverse effects, the overall behavioral consequences 
of either form of advice will (absent a skewed distribution of legal ig-
norance) tend to be socially desirable if society has set sanctions to 
optimize behavior. 
1. Advice that Corrects Misperceptions About Expected Sanctions 
Legal advice can correct misperceptions about expected sanctions 
in a variety of ways. It can inform actors that they have over- or 
underestimated the magnitude of sanctions. They might, for example, 
learn that, if a certain tax deduction they are thinking of taking is 
disallowed, the penalties are higher or lower than they thought. Ad-
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vice might also inform actors that they have over- or underestimated 
the probability that sanctions will be imposed. They might, for exam-
ple, learn that the odds of being audited are lower or higher than they 
believed. Finally, advice might inform actors that they have over- or 
underestimated the scope of conduct subject to sanctions. The deduc-
tions they can legally take might, for example, be broader or narrower 
than they thought. 
If the sanctioning regime could distinguish perfectly between desir-
able and undesirable conduct (and thus never sanctioned or deterred 
desirable conduct) and if it could also adjust expected sanctions per-
fectly (so that expected sanctions always exceeded the gain derived 
from undesirable acts), then advice that corrected misperceptions 
about expected sanctions would always be socially desirable because it 
would never discourage desirable acts or encourage undesirable acts. 
But, as we established in Part I, such a perfect sanctioning regime is 
both implausible and undesirable. Thus even ·a sanctioning regime 
that optimizes behavior will underdeter some undesirable conduct and 
overdeter some desirable conduct. Moreover, such an optimal regime 
is likely to manifest not only over- and underdeterrence in the level of 
expected sanctions, but also over- and underinclusion in the scope of 
conduct subject to sanctions. 
Correcting misperceptions of either the scope or level of expected 
sanctions will thus have mixed behavioral consequences. It increases 
the likelihood that actors will engage in any conduct - desirable or 
undesirable - when they learn that expected sanctions for that con-
duct are lower than they thought. It reduces the likelihood of that 
conduct when actors learn that expected sanctions are higher than 
they thought. 76 Some of the errors unadvised actors might make are 
socially undesirable: they might overestimate expected sanctions for 
desirable conduct or underestimate expected sanctions for undesirable 
conduct. Correcting these errors will have desirable effects because it 
increases the likelihood that actors will commit desirable acts or forgo 
undesirable acts. Other errors are socially desirable: unadvised par-
ties might overestimate expected sanctions for undesirable conduct or 
underestimate expected sanctions for desirable conduct. 77 Correcting 
these errors will have undesirable effects because it increases the likeli-
hood that actors will commit undesirable acts or forgo desirable acts. 
76. Parties with advice may also change their desirable or undesirable behavior because they 
are risk averse and discover that, although expected sanctions are at the level they expected, they 
have incorrectly estimated the magnitude of the sanction imposed in the event of detection. 
77. We assess the extent to which these errors may be undesirable on fairness grounds infra 
in Part III.A. We limit our analysis here to the desirability of the behavioral consequences that 
flow from these errors and from the advice that corrects them. 
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Kaplow and Shaven are thus wrong, we think, to conclude that 
advice about sanctionability is always desirable. 78 Because optimizing 
behavior also involves adjusting the scope of rules that define sanction-
able conduct, advice about the scope of rules will often have undesir-
able effects. Such advice might, for example, teach clients how to 
exploit tax loopholes. Or such advice might discourage clients from 
productive endeavors because they learn of unduly harsh tax conse-
quences. Similarly, Kaplow and Shaven are wrong, we think, to con-
clude that advice about the level of appropriately set expected 
sanctions is always desirable. Because even the optimal levels of ex-
pected sanctions will over- and underdeter, disseminating accurate in-
formation about them will often lead to undesirable consequences. 
Nor, once one admits the possibility of imprecision in sanctions, does 
there seem any justification for a categorical distinction between ad-
vice about the scope of sanctionable conduct and advice about the 
level of expected sanctions. 
The fact that advice about the scope or level of optimal expected 
sanctions has undesirable as well as desirable consequences does not, 
however, mean that on balance such advice has ambiguous social 
value. If society sets sanctions to optimize behavior when those sanc-
tions are known by actors, then, unless the distribution of unadvised 
ignorance is skewed, the net behavioral consequences of advice that 
corrects misperceptions about expected sanctions will tend to be so-
cially desirable. The reason is that an optimal sanctioning regime by 
definition minimizes the adverse consequences of underdeterring unde-
sirable conduct and overdeterring desirable conduct. Accordingly, 
any actual increase or decrease from the optimal level in expected 
sanctions for potentially sanctionable actions would cause more harm 
in terms of reduced desirable or increased undesirable actions than 
good in terms of reduced undesirable or increased desirable actions. 79 
Generally, over- or underestimations of optimal expected sanctions 
should disturb this social balance in the same way as actual increases 
or decreases that move expected sanctions away from optimal levels. 
Advice that corrects such over- and underestimations should accord-
ingly have net beneficial behavioral effects. 
Of course, one might assume that the legal regime would adjust 
actual sanctions to account for any increased legal ignorance resulting 
from a general restriction on legal advice. The relevant comparison 
would then be between (1) a regime with advice and those sanctions 
78. See supra text and notes accompanying notes 58-60. 
79. "Harm" and "good" here are measured under whatever scale - deterrence, compensa-
tion, retribution, and so forth - is used to derive the optimal sanctioning tradeoff. 
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that would be optimal for advised individuals, and (2) a regime with 
the restriction on advice and those sanctions that would be optimal for 
less-advised individuals. Sanction adjustments for unadvised igno-
rance would not, however, alter our general conclusion about the over-
all desirability of advice unless that unadvised ignorance was 
systematically skewed. Indeed, in some respects sanction adjustments 
for unadvised ignorance highlight a consideration which strengthens 
our general conclusion about the overall desirability of providing ad-
vice. Namely, unadvised individuals are likely to have more varied 
and disparate estimates of expected sanctions than advised individuals. 
This greater individual variation for unadvised actors will increase the 
over- and undersanctioning of any sanctioning scheme, no matter how 
much sanctions are adjusted. 80 The effect of advice in reducing this 
individual variation thus bolsters our general conclusion that advice 
about the level of expected sanctions tends to have desirable behav-
ioral effects. 
Our general conclusion does, however, have two important excep-
tions worth emphasizing. First, and most obviously, if sanctions have 
not been set to optimize behavior, it will be ambiguous whether the net 
behavioral consequences of correcting over- and underestimations will 
be socially desirable. Second, misperceptions can be socially desirable 
if those who would act undesirably are systematically more prone 
without advice to overestimate expected sanctions (or less prone to 
underestimate expected sanctions) than those who would act desira-
bly. Absent such a systemic divergence in unadvised perceptions, 
however, misperceptions of expected sanctions that optimize behavior 
will have net behavioral consequences that are negative. Legal advice 
that corrects those misperceptions will accordingly have net behav-
ioral consequences that tend to be socially desirable, even though 
many specific behavioral consequences are undesirable. 
2. Advice That Alters the Level of Expected Sanctions 
Legal advice given before conduct can help actors alter the level of 
expected sanctions by advising them how to engage in the contem-
plated conduct in ways that lower the probability or magnitude of 
sanctions. Advice can help parties create or produce information sug-
gesting that the contemplated conduct is not sanctionable. Advice 
can, for example, also help parties prevent the creation or disclosure of 
information suggesting that the conduct is sanctionable. 
80. See supra section l.B.4. We are indebted to David Friedman of the University of Chicago 
for this point. 
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Such advice will have undesirable consequences to the extent it 
lowers expected sanctions for undesirable conduct. For example, a 
lawyer may advise a party who is claiming an unwarranted deduction 
to lower the chance of detection by claiming that deduction on a line 
of the return less likely to raise suspicion. Or a lawyer may lower the 
chances of a business being found liable for price fixing by advising a 
business not to commit to writing any price discussions with its 
competitor. 
But in a regime in which sanctions deter optimally, rather than 
perfectly, some desirable conduct will also face positive expected sanc-
tions. Accordingly, advice that lowers expected sanctions can also 
benefit persons whose proposed conduct is desirable: legal advice can 
help sheep, as well as wolves, to dress in sheep's clothing. For exam-
ple, advice may inform a party who plans to take a valid tax deduction 
that a particular means of recording her expenses will minimize the 
chances her deduction will mistakenly be denied. Or a business that 
plans to engage in a legal exchange of industry-wide aggregate price 
information may be advised to make those exchanges only in writing 
so that unjustified allegations of secret price fixing are harder to make. 
These observations establish that the overall effect of advice that 
lowers expected sanctions is not necessarily harmful in general. Might 
such advice be generally beneficial? A first step in answering this ques-
tion is to observe that actors receiving advice that enables them to 
lower their expected sanctions for engaging in conduct do not act in 
isolation. Other actors, even those lacking legal advice, can sometimes 
take steps ex ante that increase the level of expected sanctions for such 
conduct. And if those other actors have legal advice, the first actor 
will face an even greater increase in expected sanctions, which will 
affect both desirable and undesirable conduct. In such cases, one can-
not assess in isolation the effect of ex ante advice that allows an actor 
to create or produce favorable information about contemplated con-
duct and to prevent the creation or disclosure of unfavorable informa-
tion. The net effect of such advice depends on whether other persons 
with an interest in the matter can also influence, ex ante, the creation 
or disclosure of information that affects the conduct's expected 
sanctions. 
When, for example, both parties to a contract receive advice about 
how best to evidence their intent in the written contract, this bilateral 
advice should generally improve the ability of tribunals to distinguish 
the desirability of the parties' conduct. The reasons for this conclu-
sion parallel those underlying the similar conclusion we drew in a 
prior article about bilateral litigation advice that influences the infor-
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mation presented about past conduct. Such bilateral litigation advice, 
we there concluded, should generally improve both the quality and 
quantity of information reaching the tribunal by enabling each party 
to screen out irrelevant information, produce more jointly available 
information, identify more information in investigation, and decrease 
unlawful withholding and suppression by its opponent.81 The net re-
sult, we argued, is that, as compared with the situation in which both 
parties lacked advice, sanctions would generally decrease for desirable 
conduct and increase for undesirable conduct. 82 
In contractual settings, ex ante bilateral advice that influences the 
information that would reach the tribunal if contemplated conduct 
were to become the subject of litigation should have similar effects. 
Consider two important goals of contract law: ensuring an accurately 
priced transaction by encouraging the identification and disclosure of 
relevant information and, in long-term contracts, reducing opportunis-
tic behavior. In a negotiation for the sale of an asset when neither 
party is represented by counsel, one might expect that the parties' 
written agreement (if any) would describe the essential elements of the 
transaction less accurately, specify the information relevant to accu-
rate pricing less clearly, and contain less effective prohibitions on op-
portunistic behavior than an agreement negotiated by lawyers. 
Consequently, a tribunal required to resolve a dispute about the trans-
action is more likely to make errors both in failing to sanction undesir-
able conduct and in sanctioning desirable conduct. 
If only the seller were represented, one would instead expect that 
legal advice about how to conduct the negotiations and to word the 
agreement would tend to lower the seller's expected sanctions for fail-
ing to disclose information or for opportunistic behavior. When both 
buyer and seller have attorneys, however, lawyers will prepare and 
negotiate written warranties, covenants, and other provisions whose 
principal ex ante effect is to increase expected sanctions for misrepre-
sentation and strategic behavior.83 One can therefore expect contracts 
negotiated by parties with legal advice generally to be more accurately 
81. See Bundy & Elhauge, supra note 33, at 335-61. 
82. Id. at 381-82. 
83. Cf. Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 
94 YALE L.J. 239 (1984). Gilson's account suggests that, when business lawyers are on both 
sides of the transaction, they typically participate heavily in negotiations over provisions 
designed to increase the seller's expected sanctions for nondisclosure in the form of representa-
tions, warranties, and indemnification agreements. Id. at 267-87. They also help draft agree-
ments to control strategic behavior in long-term transactions. Id. at 265-67 (discussing eamout 
formulas). 
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priced and less vulnerable to opportunistic behavior than transactions 
negotiated by unrepresented parties. 
Suppose, however, that a severe imbalance exists in the quality of 
advice received, that other affected parties lack advice altogether, or 
that other affected parties cannot observe an actor's conduct or influ-
ence the information created and preserved about that conduct. The 
paradigm cases here might be a form contract of adhesion drafted by 
lawyers for a large corporation for use in consumer transactions or a 
decision by taxpayer to document a deduction. In such cases, advice 
will tend unilaterally to lower expected sanctions for both desirable 
and undesirable contemplated conduct. 
For reasons we discussed in our prior article, in such circum-
stances the increase in favorable information created or disclosed 
about conduct will still tend to exceed the decrease in unfavorable in-
formation. 84 Various factors contribute to this result. First, even 
when other actors have no access to information held by the party 
receiving advice, advice should still enable the party to classify more 
information as relevant and to identify more information to create, 
produce, document, or preserve. Second, for any advice given, the 
lawyer's own susceptibility to sanctions for nondisclosure should, 
when an applicable law requires disclosure, result in the disclosure of 
additional information. 85 Finally, for any set of information that can 
be created or disclosed by either party, advice about information selec-
tion can increase the favorable information created or disclosed from 
this set more than it can reduce the unfavorable information created or 
disclosed. 
This informational conclusion has behavioral relevance because 
there will tend to be more favorable information that can be created, 
preserved, or produced about desirable conduct than about undesir-
able conduct. For example, a taxpayer will normally have or be able 
to document more evidence to support a justified deduction than an 
unjustified one. As a result of these factors, unilateral conduct advice 
should decrease expected sanctions for desirable conduct somewhat 
more than for undesirable conduct. 
In some cases, though, the desirability of this differential effect on 
expected sanctions may tum on whether the regime can (and does) 
84. See Bundy & Elhauge, supra note 33, at 335-61, 373-74, 383-85 (describing the effects of 
unilateral advice). 
85. Id. at 352-55 (discussing effect in litigation of lawyers' special susceptibility to sanctions); 
cf. Kraakman, supra note 33, at 82-83 (discussing due diligence review by attorneys under§ 11 of 
the Securities Act of 1933). Moreover, because attorneys and law firms are repeat players, they 
may have reputational interests in being more forthcoming than their clients might wish. 
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adjust expected sanctions to take account of the effects of unilateral 
advice. 86 Since legal advice may reduce the detectability of both desir-
able and undesirable conduct, transactions involving lawyer participa-
tion may require additional investments in enforcement resources. 
Alternatively, the regime might increase actual sanctions for legally 
advised parties to offset the decline in expected sanctions for undesir-
able actors, without fully offsetting the decline in expected sanctions 
for desirable actors. Or actual sanctions might be increased to offset 
the decline in expected sanctions for desirable actors while resulting in 
a net increase in sanctions for undesirable actors. 
Significantly, many legal rules do in fact require or permit the tri-
bunal to adjust the sanctions applicable to disputed nonlitigation 
transactions in order to disfavor a party whose greater legal sophistica-
tion actually or presumptively enabled it to exercise disproportionate 
influence on the information reaching the tribunal about the transac-
tion. Examples include the strict rules of fairness governing business 
transactions between lawyers and clients;87 the rules governing the 
construction and application of insurance policies, which strongly 
favor policyholders;88 and the doctrine of unconscionability, which 
gives explicit weight to differences in the transacting parties' legal so-
phistication. 89 Similarly, on the reasonable assumption that the party 
with better access to a lawyer is more likely to take charge of drafting, 
the general rule that contracts should be construed against the drafter 
may also reflect this approach. 
Still, in some instances unilateral ex ante advice that lowers ex-
pected sanctions will not have beneficial net effects. This is most 
likely, we think, for cases in which the marginal returns to legal advice 
diminish more sharply for desirable conduct than for undesirable con-
duct. 90 This can occur because, even in an imperfect regime of sanc-
tions, expected sanctions for desirable conduct are often much lower 
than those for undesirable conduct. For example, an unadvised tax-
payer taking a lawful deduction may face much lower expected sanc-
tions than an unadvised taxpayer taking an unlawful deduction. 
86. See Bundy & Elhauge, supra note 33, at 386-91. 
87. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule l.8(a) (1992). 
88. See FRIEDRICH KESSLER ET AL., CONTRACTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 625-634 (3d ed. 
1986). 
89. See UNIF. CONSUMER CREDIT CODE§§ 5.108(4)(e), (5)(c), 7 U.L.A. 168 (1974); see also 
Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Bargain Principle and Its Limits, 95 HARV. L. REV. 741, 763-73 
(1982) (proposing and defending a limit on the enforcement of bargained promises in cases of 
"transactional incapacity"). 
90. For discussion of this phenomenon as it applies to advice given in litigation, see Bundy & 
Elhauge, supra note 33, at 384-85. 
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Consequently, even though there may be a greater number of taxpay-
ers helped by advice about lawful deductions, there is greater potential 
for advice to improve the situation of the would-be violators. 
The risk that marginal returns to advice will diminish more 
sharply for desirable than undesirable conduct depends in important 
part on the precision of the sanctioning regime. In a regime designed 
so that desirable conduct never faces positive expected sanctions, ex 
ante advice can never lower sanctions for desirable conduct; advice for 
undesirable conduct will always have higher marginal returns. In ef-
fect, Shavell assumes such a regime as the basis for his conclusion that 
all ex ante advice that lowers expected sanctions is undesirable. But 
we can now see that this regime represents the limiting case for the 
desirability of such advice, rather than the paradigm case. 
Accordingly, unlike Kaplow and Shavell, we do not think that ad-
vice that helps parties lower the actual level of expected sanctions for 
contemplated conduct is always undesirable, even if sanctions are opti-
mally set. Such advice is often socially desirable. Indeed, advice that 
lowers sanctions generally tends to have desirable effects. To be sure, 
this tendency may depend on the ability of other parties to influence 
sanctions and on the ability of the sanctioning regime to adjust sanc-
tions. There will also be cases where, due to diminishing marginal 
returns from advice, the net effects of unilateral advice clearly favor 
undesirable conduct. In such cases, restrictions on advice that lowers 
expected sanctions may well be justified. But there is no justification 
for drawing a sharp categorical distinction between advice that simply 
communicates the level of expected sanctions and advice that alters 
that level. 
3. Conclusion 
Although the work of Kaplow and Shavell has greatly advanced 
the economic modeling of legal advice, we are forced to disagree with 
their conclusions about the desirability of different categories of legal 
counseling. The differences in conclusions stem from differences in 
assumptions. Although not explicit in their work, Kaplow and 
Shavell have implicitly analyzed the desirability of advice under a re-
gime of "perfect" sanctions that is not only unrealistic but undesirable, 
even in an ideal world. 91 The performance of legal advice under such 
91. See Part I. A similar difference in assumptions also underlies the differences between our 
conclusions and some of those reached in Louis Kaplow, Optimal Deterrence, Uninformed lndi· 
vidua/s, and Acquiring Information About Whether Acts Are Subject to Sanctions, 6 J.L. ECON. & 
0RG. 93, 109-11 (1990). Kaplow assumes, we think implausibly, that harmless acts are never 
illegal and never sanctioned, see id. at 96-97, and that "acts not subject to sanctions cause no 
harm." Id. at 102 n.13. In any event, his analysis focuses on a related, but different, issue: 
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perfect sanctioning regimes is at best irrelevant. 92 
Worse, such analyses can be misleading if the subtext to the claim 
that advice about perfect sanctions is desirable is that, if adverse be-
havioral effects persist, the target of blame and reform should be the 
sanctioning regime rather than the advice. For advice about optimal 
but imperfect sanctions, or at least some forms of such advice, may 
well be undesirable and thus an appropriate target of reform. The rel-
evant question is thus whether legal advice about sanctions is desirable 
under a regime that, although unavoidably imperfect, at least opti-
mizes behavior in the face of unavoidable imperfection. Only if and 
when the answer to this question is "yes" can a plausible case be made 
that the best target of reform is not legal advice but any nonoptimal 
sanctions. 
One must, however, take into account that the option of reforming 
the regime of sanctions will not always be feasible. Sometimes the 
lawmaking process is too sloppy or biased to optimize sanctions: spe-
cial interests may, for example, have "captured" the legislature.93 
Other times even perfectly conscientious lawmakers cannot assure op-
timal sanctions. The definition of sanctionable conduct may fag be-
hind societal changes. Transaction costs may prove significant: the 
costs of defining sanctionable conduct (including the cost of securing 
legislative action) may exceed the benefits of a more optimal definition. 
More fundamentally, society may choose not to optimize sanctions 
solely in terms of their behavioral effects. It may regard mistaken 
sanctioning as inherently wrong because it punishes the innocent or 
whether and why ignorance of the law should or should not be a defense or basis for adjusting 
legal sanctions. Id. at 114-17. 
92. In a more recent piece, Kaplow and Shaven do analyze the desirability of advice given 
tribunal error, concluding that advice about tribunal error in strict liability cases is always so-
cially undesirable. Kaplow & Shaven, supra note 75, at 308, 312-14. They reach this conclusion, 
however, for two reasons. 
First, they assume that sanctions serve solely as a price tag that measures the harm inflicted 
by the given conduct, making conduct desirable if and only if the private benefits exceed the 
"price," that is, the social harm measured by appropriately set sanctions. Accordingly, in their 
model an increase or decrease in sanctions from the appropriate level causes more undesirable 
conduct because the "mispricing" leads either to too much care, if the price is too high, or to too 
little care, if the price is too low. Although some civil penalties do undoubtedly serve only a 
price-tag function, Kaplow and Shavell's reasoning is inapplicable when the undesirability of 
conduct does not depend on the level of private benefits, which we think better describes typical 
regulation. 
Second, Kaplow and Shaven separate advice about the appropriate level of sanctions from 
advice about trial error. The client who learns about the trial error is thus presumed to already 
know the appropriate level of sanctions. See id. at 308, 312-13. If one more realistically assumes 
that ex ante legal advice will simultaneously provide both sorts of advice, then an increase or 
decrease in the desirability of conduct is possible. 
93. See generally Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judi-
cial Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31, 35-44 (1991) (describing interest group theory). 
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fails to revenge or compensate injury, or it may take into account di-
rect costs, such as the costs of incarceration. To the extent this is true, 
optimal sanctions will not be those that optimize behavior, and the 
overall behavioral consequences of legal advice about optimal sanc-
tions will be ambiguous. When society uses such nonbehavioral meas-
ures to judge the social desirability of sanctions, ho'{llever, advice about 
sanctions similarly should be judged, at least in part, by nonbehavioral 
criteria. We assess the extent to which such criteria might justify ad-
vice about sanctions in section III.A. 
C. The Desirability of Litigation Advice Versus Legal Counseling 
We now return to the claim that the social desirability of litigation 
advice and primary conduct categorically differ. Recall that this claim 
takes two forms. The first is Kaplow and Shavell's fifth conclusion: 
that a "sharp contrast" exists between the "socially desirable character 
of legal advice offered ex ante" to primary conduct and the "question-
able social value of advice offered during litigation."94 The second is 
the claim, prominently featured in Kaye, Scholer's legal defense, that 
litigation advice is categorically more desirable than advice about pri-
mary conduct. We begin with Kaplow and Shavell's claim. 
In prior writing, we have questioned Kaplow and Shavell's analy-
sis of litigation advice from a solely ex post perspective - expressly 
restricting ourselves, as Kaplow and Shavell did, to the effects of liti-
gation advice on the information presented about past primary con-
duct. 95 We there concluded that, even if advised parties pursue 
opportunities to suppress or withhold information, the overall infor-
mational effects of litigation advice will generally help tribunals decide 
more accurately who should be sanctioned.96 Here we challenge the 
very assumption that evaluating litigation advice should proceed from 
an ex post perspective. 
An initial practical problem facing any categorical distinction be-
tween litigation and primary conduct advice is that the two forms of 
advice overlap to a great extent. Advice during litigation often in-
forms parties about the legal sanctions applicable to future primary 
conduct.97 It seems undeniable, for example, that Kaye, Scholer's rep-
resentation of Lincoln Savings before the Office of Thrift Supervision, 
94. Kaplow & Shavell, Legal Advice About Information, supra note 4, at 597, 600, 614-15; see 
supra text accompanying note 71. 
95. See Bundy & Elhauge, supra note 33, at 319, 349 & n.84, 402 & n.223. 
96. Id. at 319, 335-61. 
97. Kaplow and Shavell's second piece on the subject avoids this problem because it does not 
distinguish legal counseling from litigation advice but rather distinguishes advice given before 
conduct from advice given after conduct. See Kaplow & Shavell, Legal Advice About Acts Al-
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even if fairly characterized as litigation advice, also provided Lincoln 
with substantial information about ongoing compliance issues.98 Fur-
ther, advice prior to primary conduct often concerns evidentiary is-
sues. It is difficult, for example, to know whether to characterize 
advice about whether to comply with or breach a contract as directed 
to primary conduct or to litigation conduct. Indeed, as Kaplow and 
Shaven concede,99 the likelihood of parties obtaining litigation advice 
ex ante to primary conduct will naturally increase if the law, relying 
on the supposed sharp contrast, attempts to restrict advice during 
litigation. 
More fundamentally, even classic litigation advice is, like advice 
prior to primary conduct, actually ex ante advice about the sanctions 
applicable to contemplated conduct. There are, to be sure, some dif-
ferences. The contemplated conduct guided by litigation advice is gen-
erally not primary conduct but evidentiary conduct, such as 
investigating, suppressing, withholding, producing, or presenting in-
formation in litigation. And the sanctions for misconduct are usually 
provided not by the laws governing primary conduct, but by the evi-
dentiary sanctions imposed under the rules governing the production 
of evidence.100 But these are differences in form, not substance. Our 
analysis of advice about sanctions thus applies just as much to advice 
about evidentiary sanctions as to advice about primary conduct sanc-
tions. Kaplow and Shavell's contrary conclusion 101 rests not on a 
comparative analysis of the sanctions applicable to evidentiary versus 
primary conduct, but rather on a model that abstracts from the exist-
ence and effect of evidentiary sanctions.102 
The problem of imprecise sanctioning is essentially the same for 
litigation conduct as for primary conduct. As with primary conduct, 
it is often difficult to determine whether litigation conduct is desirable 
or undesirable. Withholding and suppression sometimes leave no 
traces because they occur in private. When a witness "forgets" a con-
versation, no one can directly observe whether her lack of recall is real 
ready Committed, supra note 4, at 149. This second distinction is, however, vulnerable to all the 
other problems discussed in this section. 
98. See, e.g., Wilkins, supra note 8, at 1190-91 (describing the potential overlap between 
litigation and counseling advice in that case). · 
99. Kaplow & Shaven, Legal Advice About Information, supra note 4, at 599. 
100. Evidentiary sanctions include discovery sanctions and penalties imposed for perjury or 
refusing to testify. They also include implicit sanctions, such as when a tribunal draws an ad-
verse inference about a party's entire testimony or case when some of her testimony appears false. 
See generally Bundy & Elhauge, supra note 33, at 321 (defining evidentiary sanctions). 
101. They treat their analysis of advice about sanctions as inapplicable to litigation advice. 
See Kaplow & Shaven, Legal Advice About Information, supra note 4, at 597. 
102. See id. at 571. 
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or feigned. This means that sometimes undesirable withholding or 
suppression is indistinguishable from the desirable production of infor-
mation. The person who truly did not witness or does not remember 
an event can closely resemble the person who falsely claims not to 
have done so. The person who accurately claims that he did not in-
tend to kill when he fired the fatal shot will often closely resemble the 
person who falsely makes the same claim. 
Moreover, withholding or suppressing information can be socially 
desirable. Some withholding or suppression may promote desirable 
out-of-court conduct or protect against invasions of privacy. 103 Many 
evidentiary privileges, including the Fourth Amendment, fall into this 
category. Other withholding or suppression may promote desirable 
conduct in litigation. Assertions of attorney-client privilege and work-
product doctrine are said to have this effect.104 Finally, withholding 
or suppression may protect against coercive or unfair tactics by the 
opponent. In civil actions, this consideration might justify the right to 
object to unduly burdensome discovery and unfair or misleading 
cross-examination. In criminal cases, this principle supports the rights 
guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment. 105 To the extent it is difficult 
not only to determine whether withholding or suppression is occurring 
but also to distinguish between desirable and undesirable forms of 
withholding and suppression, this further impairs the tribunal's ability 
to distinguish between desirable and undesirable evidentiary conduct. 
As with primary conduct, the legal regime responds to its inability 
to distinguish with certainty between desirable and undesirable eviden-
tiary conduct with three strategies: (1) sanctioning when certain 
probability thresholds are met in adjudication; (2) defining the sanc-
tionable conduct using criteria that provide greater certainty but are 
less closely correlated to social desirability; and (3) adjusting the level 
of sanctions. 
Take, for example, the offense of lying to the tribunal. Sanctioning 
lies only when they can be detected with certainty may underdeter 
lying. Indeed, observers generally consider the criminal law of per-
jury, which demands proof that is close to certainty, to be ineffec-
103. See generally Bundy & Elhauge, supra note 33, at 349 n.82 (discussing Fourth 
Amendment). 
104. See generally id. at 401-13 (analyzing effects of attorney-client and work-product 
privileges). 
105. See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 
(1966) (stating that a principal purpose of the Fifth Amendment is to protect against government 
coercion). The values promoted by the Fifth Amendment might well justify suppression that 
took the form of apt advice to a nonparty witness that she ought to decline to testify. See Bundy 
& Elhauge, supra note 33, at 326 & n.39. 
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tive. 106 Tribunals may, however, implement a threshold probability 
strategy by forming ad hoc estimates of the probability the witness has 
lied based on his demeanor, his motive and opportunity to lie, and 
other, more reliable evidence about the case. If a threshold probability 
is met, the tribunal can then sanction the party presenting the testi-
mony by discrediting either the seemingly false testimony itself or 
other evidence in the party's case that would otherwise seem credible 
and that may actually be true. 107 The tribunal may also increase or 
reduce the severity of the sanction imposed at final judgment to punish 
a party who, it believes, has knowingly presented false testimony. 108 
The lower the threshold probability required to trigger such sanctions, 
the more desirable evidentiary conduct (truthtelling) will be sanc-
tioned; the higher the probability, the more undesirable evidentiary 
conduct (lying) will go unsanctioned. 
Alternatively, lawmakers may apply a more broadly framed rule. 
Such a rule might, for example, disqualify parties or other interested 
persons as witnesses in all cases. English and U.S. law formerly pur-
sued versions of this approach in both civil and criminal cases.109 A 
more narrow version of such a rule might disqualify interested parties 
from testifying only when their testimony is especially hard to verify. 
The "Dead Man's Act," which bars the survivor of a transaction with 
a deceased person from testifying against that person's estate, illus-
trates this principle. 110 Either effort to redefine the sanctionable con-
duct will plainly be under- and overinclusive: the rule will not 
sanction lying by persons who fall outside the disqualified categories, 
and it will prevent both true and false testimony from persons who are 
disqualified. 111 Principally for this reason, the Supreme Court rejected 
broad rules of testimonial disqualification as unconstitutional in crimi-
nal cases. 112 
Finally, the tribunal may not wholly discredit or disallow testi-
mony but instead may discount apparently unreliable testimony by the 
106. See FRANK, supra note 1, at 85. 
107. 3A JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1010, at 983 (John H. Chadbourn rev. ed. 1970). 
108. For example, judges may increase the sentence of convicted defendants whom they be-
lieve testified falsely at trial. The Supreme Court held this practice consistent with both federal 
sentencing law and the Constitution in United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41 (1978). 
109. 2 WtGMORE, supra note 107, § 576. 
110. See id. § 578, at 819-20 (citing Owens v. Owens's Admr., 14 W. Va. 88, 95 (1878); 
Louis's Admr. v. Easton, 50 Ala. 470, 471 (1874)). 
111. Indeed, those who attack disqualification on the ground of interest do so on precisely 
this ground. 2 WIGMORE, supra note 107, § 578, at 821. 
112. The Supreme Court has rejected these rules as applied to both defendants, Rock v. 
Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 61-62 (1987); Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570 (1961), and codefend-
ants. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967). 
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probability that it is untrue. This corresponds to adjusting the level of 
sanctions in a manner that may be optimal, but ~hich undersanctions 
undesirable conduct and oversanctions desirable conduct. Liars will 
benefit more than they should, while those who tell the truth will bene-
fit less than they should. The higher the discount, the less the regime 
will undersanction undesirable evidentiary conduct but the more it 
will oversanction desirable evidentiary conduct. 
Plainly none of these strategies can achieve perfect sanctioning. 
But there is no evident reason to think that one can make the sanction-
ing of primary conduct any more perfect. The basic forms of with-
holding and suppressing information, ranging from murder (of 
witnesses) to simple nondisclosure, have analogues in primary con-
duct. In particular, the fact that evidentiary conduct involves disclo-
sure obligations, and hence the risk of undetectable failures to disclose, 
does not distinguish it from primary conduct, as the extensive regula-
tion of disclosures in securities, tax, environmental, tort, and contract 
law demonstrates. Indeed, failures to disclose in litigation arguably 
present an easier problem of detection than some nonlitigation failures 
to disclose because in litigation the opponent and the tribunal are both 
alerted to the possibility of wrongful suppression and nondisclosure 
and have incentives to detect them. 
Given the lack of theoretical foundation for the conclusion that 
litigation advice is categorically less desirable than primary conduct, 
that conclusion must rest on an empirical claim that current eviden-
tiary sanctions are in fact less perfect or optimal than current primary 
conduct sanctions. Such an empirical claim seems difficult to sustain. 
It would require showing how frequently evidentiary sanctions under-
sanction undesirable conduct or oversanction desirable conduct, and 
then showing, for representative categories of primary conduct, that 
the imperfection is lower. 
Certainly Kaplow and Shavell's account does not sustain this bur-
den. Their account assumes the existence of a set of information over 
which a party can exercise control, in the sense that withholding or 
suppressing the information is not deterred. 113 But neither the exist-
ence of a set of information whose wrongful withholding or suppres-
sion is undersanctioned, nor the occurrence of some acts of wrongful 
withholding or suppression, establishes the comparative superiority of 
advice about sanctions for primary conduct. After all, expected sanc-
tions for wrongful primary conduct also frequently underdeter unde-
sirable conduct, and wrongful acts of primary conduct occur as well. 
113. Kaplow & Shaven, Legal Advice About Information, supra note 4, at 570-76, 577 n.25. 
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Kaplow and Shavell's posited "sharp contrast" between the social 
value of advice about evidentiary conduct and advice about primary 
conduct thus rests on a misleading comparison between a regime of 
evidentiary sanctions that is assumed, but not demonstrated, to be in-
effective and a regime of sanctions for primary conduct that is as-
sumed, but not demonstrated, to be perfect. 
More fundamentally, the failure of evidentiary sanctions to deter 
all withholding or suppression cannot be conclusive because such evi-
dentiary conduct is sometimes socially desirable. 114 To the extent 
withholding and suppression are desirable, the desirability of litigation 
advice (and in particular advice about evidentiary sanctions) cannot be 
judged, as we were willing to do in our prior article, 115 solely by its 
effects on the information reaching tribunals. Rather it must be 
judged by whether it advances overall societal interests - including 
the interests served by withholding and suppression. 
Under this standard, if evidentiary sanctions optimize evidentiary 
conduct, then litigation advice may well tend to be desirable even 
when it has a negative effect on the information reaching tribunals. 
True, such negative informational effects may worsen the regime's 
ability to sanction the primary conduct that is the subject of litigation. 
But the regime has no reason to focus exclusively on optimizing pri-
mary conduct. Nor, if it chooses to pursue that goal, must it do so 
exclusively by increasing the accuracy with which adjudication identi-
fies the desirability of primary conduct.116 Instead, the regime may 
aim to optimize the combination of primary and litigation conduct by 
implementing the sanctioning regime that minimizes the total adverse 
consequences of undersanctioning undesirable primary and litigation 
conduct and oversanctioning desirable primary and litigation conduct. 
We conclude, therefore, that the claim that advice about eviden-
tiary conduct is systematically inferior to advice about primary con-
duct cannot be sustained. Both forms of advice will correct over- and 
underestimations of expected sanctions, with desirable and undesirable 
behavioral consequences. 117 Both will overall tend to have desirable 
114. See supra section I.A and text accompanying notes 103-05. 
115. See Bundy & Elhauge, supra note 33, at 380-96 (analyzing desirability solely of the 
informational effects of advice). 
116. See supra section I.A (noting that increased information might itself deter desirable 
primary conduct). 
117. The beneficial behavioral consequences of correcting overestimations of evidentiary 
sanctions may sometimes be indirect. Take, for example, a party who overestimates discovery 
sanctions for failing to produce a document they truly do not possess. In the extreme this may 
deter the desirable production of the information that the party truly does not have the document 
by tempting the party to create a false document. Perhaps more likely, this may deter the party 
from engaging in other desirable litigation conduct - such as litigating a legitimate claim or 
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behavioral consequences, unless sanctions do not optimize behavior or 
a systemic divergence exists between the misperceptions of desirable 
and undesirable actors. 
Both types of advice will also help parties take steps, prior to en-
gaging in conduct, to influence the information that will reach the tri-
bunal about that conduct. 118 In other words, both types of advice will 
affect the level of expected sanctions. When both parties seek to shape 
the information that will reach the tribunal, this effect should be desir-
able.119 One might, if anything, expect this desirable result more often 
in the litigation context, in which parties know and have focused on 
their adversary, than in the nonlitigation context, in which affected 
parties often do not know or monitor the parties who injure them. 
When only one party acts to shape the information that will reach the 
tribunal, advice should also tend to be desirable, although this may 
depend in part on the regime's ability to adjust sanctions. 120 
This framework also makes it possible to show why the claim that 
litigation advice is categorically more desirable than advice about pri-
mary conduct, while seemingly plausible, ultimately fails as well. The 
core of that claim rests on the presence in open court of a legally ad-
vised adversary and a tribunal. Their presence, the argument goes, 
greatly reduces the lawyer's concern that his advice and assistance will 
have harmful consequences. Because concealment and fabrication of 
evidence are more likely to be detected and sanctioned, his advice 
about the level of expected sanctions will tend to deter it. Moreover, 
because of the presence of the opponent, the lawyer need have no fear 
that his advice about how to lower sanctions for withholding or 
fabrication of evidence will result in net harmful consequences because 
the opposing counsel's advice will tend to neutralize it. 121 In contrast, 
in nonlitigation counseling situations, the observing opponent, her 
lawyer, and the tribunal are absent. 122 In consequence, the counselor 
who provides full advice, either about the level of expected sanctions 
defense or presenting other information - that seems likely to lead to a request for a document. 
Deterring such litigation conduct will skew sanctions for primary conduct. 
118. Legal counseling will affect the information that reaches the tribunal about contem-
plated primary conduct in the ways described supra in section 11.B.2. Litigation advice will 
affect, in the same ways, information that reaches the tribunal about contemplated litigation 
conduct. It will also affect the information that reaches the tribunal about past conduct in the 
ways described in Bundy & Elhauge, supra note 33, at 335-61. 
119. See supra text accompanying note 81. 
120. See supra text accompanying notes 84-86. 
121. Wilkins, supra note 8, at 1184 & nn.159-60 (outlining and apparently endorsing this 
claim, at least when there is no substantial imbalance in the advice available to the parties). 
122. See id. at 1188 (in the "prototypical counseling situation," only one party is present and 
represented by counsel). 
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or how to lower them, runs a greater risk of facilitating undesirable 
conduct. 
Within our framework of analysis, this claim is most plausible if 
understood as asserting that ex ante advice that allows a party to lower 
her expected sanctions (or raise her opponent's expected sanctions) for 
evidentiary conduct is categorically superior to comparable ex ante ad-
vice for primary conduct. As we have shown, there is no reason to 
believe that the scope or level of expected evidentiary sanctions, unin-
fluenced by advice that potentially lowers (or raises) those sanctions, is 
any more optimal than the scope or level of similarly uninfluenced 
primary conduct sanctions. Nor is there any strong reason to think 
that parties' estimates of expected evidentiary sanctions are more 
likely to be systematically skewed in ways that produce desirable be-
havioral effects. If advice about the scope and level of evidentiary 
sanctions is categorically superior to advice about the scope and level 
of primary conduct sanctions, therefore, it must be because advice 
about how to influence the level of expected sanctions in litigation is 
categorically more likely to move the overall level of expected sanc-
tions to optimal levels than is advice outside of litigation. 
Understood as a claim about the effects of advice that lowers ex-
pected sanctions by creating, producing, or concealing information 
about evidentiary conduct, the claim for the superiority of litigation 
advice contains a core of persuasive insight. As we have seen, such 
advice is generally more likely to be beneficial to the extent that an-
other interested actor can observe the party's conduct and still more 
beneficial to the extent that the observer has legal advice. In a well-
run courtroom - where both parties are aware of each other's mo-
tives, can observe each other's evidentiary conduct, have lawyers, and 
can resort to the tribunal for prompt rulings on disputed questions -
one might therefore expect that advice about how to lower one's own 
evidentiary sanctions (or raise one's opponent's) will often have desira-
ble effects. 
The force of this insight, however, leaves us a long way from a 
categorical distinction between nonlitigation and litigation advice. We 
need to know more about the relative frequency of these conditions in 
litigation and nonlitigation settings. The argument would be easy if in 
litigation evidentiary conduct were always observable, both sides al-
ways had competent counsel, and the tribunal was always present, 
while interested actors rarely observed primary conduct or rarely had 
legal advice. 123 But this is not the case. Evidentiary conduct varies 
123. Fuller's account, which contrasts the conduct of competent paired advocates "in open 
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sharply in the extent to which it is subject to observation by the oppo-
nent. Lawyers' arguments and direct testimony can be closely ob-
served, but most trial preparation cannot. Moreover, much litigation 
features severe imbalances in parties' legal advice. 
Conversely, in many cases in which an actor receives advice about 
how to lower expected sanctions for primary conduct, that conduct is 
subject to observation by someone who has a substantial incentive to 
monitor the actor's conduct and increase his sanctions for any undesir-
able conduct. This will be true, for example, in most contractual set-
tings and in many regulatory settings. Much of the conduct that 
Kaye, Scholer was charged with assisting, for example, was observa-
ble, and observed, by the Bank Board.124 Often that observer will 
have legal advice. Indeed, the situation in which all interested partici-
pants, including government regulators, have advice is probably typi-
cal of most complex transactional and regulatory work. 
Thus in both litigation and nonlitigation settings, there will be 
many occasions in which advice about how to lower expected sanc-
tions for engaging in conduct will be strongly desirable because there 
is a high likelihood that the conduct can be observed, that the observer 
will be interested, and that the observer will have comparable compe-
tent legal advice. In both settings, there will also be occasions when 
one party has a disproportionate influence on the information that will 
reach the tribunal, either because the actor receiving advice controls 
more information about the conduct or has better legal advice; in these 
cases the desirability of advice will sometimes depend on the regime's 
ability to adjust sanctions. 
Finally, in each setting there will be occasions when sanctions can-
not be adjusted to take advantage of increases in information resulting 
from the provision of advice or when advice simply reduces sanctions 
more for undesirable than for desirable conduct. Absent some reason 
to think, however, that situations of the last type are more common 
when advice is given outside the litigation setting, a categorical claim 
for the superiority of litigation advice cannot stand. 
Ill. NONCATEGORICAL REsTRICTIONS ON ADVICE 
We have identified two main classes of advice about expected sanc-
tions that have undesirable effects on the behavior of recipients. First, 
parties who learn that expected sanctions for desirable conduct are 
court" with the conduct of a single lawyer offering "quiet counsel" in the privacy of his own 
office, typifies this view. Fuller & Randall, supra note 7, at 1161. 
124. See Wilkins, supra note 8, at 1173 & n.116 (describing such a situation). 
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higher than they thought will be led to refrain from desirable conduct. 
Second, parties who learn that expected sanctions for undesirable con-
duct are lower than they thought, or who get advice about how to 
lower them, will sometimes be led to engage in undesirable conduct. If 
the legal regime could reliably identify actors who tend to make so-
cially desirable mistakes about expected sanctions, selectively denying 
them advice would improve the optimization of over- and underdeter-
rence. In section Ill.A we argue that, even if such targeted denials 
could be made accurately, they would often conflict with principles of 
fairness. In section III.B we address the problem that efforts to deny 
advice that produces undesirable consequences will also deter or deny 
desirable advice. 
A. Fairness Justifications for Advice with Adverse Behavioral 
Consequences 
The fairness claim is clearest in the case of those who would forgo 
desirable acts if advised about the true risk of sanctions. Denying such 
persons advice would penalize them not because they are potential 
lawbreakers, but because (without advice) they would engage in more 
desirable conduct. To allow such persons to proceed in ignorance is 
unfair because it violates the principle that "one should be able to 
know of the law in order that one can obey it."125 Denying them ad-
vice also returns evil for good because it increases both the likelihood 
that the person will act as society wishes and the likelihood that soci-
ety will punish the person. In a just regime, it may sometimes be inev-
itable that those who act desirably will face a risk of sanctions. But it 
is hard to see how it can be just to impose this risk on desirable actors 
when they have been denied a reasonable opportunity to obtain knowl-
edge that would have prevented them from engaging in the conduct 
subject to the risk of sanctions. 
These principles do not justify giving advice when it would cause 
persons to engage in undesirable acts, assuming that such persons can 
be identified. For example, actors who would steal from others if ac-
curately advised that the risk of punishment was lower than they 
thought cannot plausibly claim unfairness if they are denied such ad-
vice.126 It might be argued that even those who predictably will en-
gage in wrongdoing if fully advised are entitled to advice as a matter of 
125. Kaplow & Shavell, Legal Advice About Information, supra note 4, at 609. Because of 
what we argue is their false distinction between legal counseling and litigation advice, Kaplow 
and Shavell conclude that this principle justifies advice about primary conduct but not advice 
about litigation conduct. Id. at 609 & n.113. , 
126. Cf. Dan-Cohen, supra note 14, at 672 ("If the individual's actions fall outside the sphere 
of autonomy he cannot complain of a deprivation of autonomy, when he discovers that the fear 
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personal autonomy or dignity. But such claims have questionable 
force when the actor is an organization, rather than an individual. 127 
More fundamentally, it is difficult to frame an attractive conception of 
individual autonomy that would justify such advice, at least when the 
undesirability of the resulting conduct is sufficiently clear and its likeli-
hood sufficiently high. 128 The autonomy claim is especially problem-
atic if, as is usually the case, the undesirable conduct harms innocent 
actors because then the claim amounts to favoring the autonomy of 
the undesirable actor to commit harm over the autonomy of the inno-
cent actor to be free of undesirable harm. 
As a general rule, then, it is not unfair to deny advice to an actor 
when the legal system can be certain that the advice would lead him to 
engage in undesirable conduct. But some persons denied advice on 
that ground may have a claim of unfairness if other persons have, or 
can obtain, knowledge about sanctions for undesirable conduct that 
enables them to harm the person denied advice. 
The supposed obligation to tell the "the truth, the whole truth, and 
nothing but the truth" illustrates the point. Ostensibly, this oath obli-
gates witnesses to volunteer information. In fact, although a literal 
violation of the oath, a party who is not asked about certain informa-
tion can legally fail to volunteer it. Suppose, however, that an unad-
vised party believes the oath and volunteers information on the 
assumption that failure to comply with the oath will be detected and 
that shaped his conduct was excessive and that ... he could have violated his duty with 
impunity."). 
127. See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 STAN. L. REV. 
589, 607-08 (1985) (corporations lack claim to individual autonomy). See generally MEIR DAN· 
COHEN, RIGHTS, PERSONS, AND ORGANIZATIONS: A LEGAL THEORY FOR A BUREAUCRATIC 
SOCIETY (1986) (same). 
128. See, e.g., Dan-Cohen, supra note 14, at 671-72 (arguing that keeping a would-be wrong-
doer in ignorance does not infringe Kantian autonomy). Perhaps for that reason, those who 
found the right to advice on autonomy or dignity normally would not extend that right to per-
sons who will certainly use advice to engage in undesirable conduct. Instead they argue that 
lawyers should not too readily conclude either: (1) that any particular class of conduct is unde-
sirable, see MONROE H. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 51-57 
(1975); Alan Donagan, Justifying Legal Practice in the Adversary System, in THE GOOD LAW· 
YER 123, 126-33 (David Luban ed., 1983); or (2) that any particular client, if fully advised, would 
in fact engage in such conduct. See, e.g .. MONROE H. FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAW· 
YERS' ETHICS 159 (1990) (arguing that a lawyer giving advice should not assume that the client 
when advised will engage in wrongdoing, even if the client has a strong incentive to do so). 
These more limited positions are not necessarily inconsistent with the account offered here. 
To the extent they treat freedom of choice as a positive good that can render otherwise undesir-
able conduct desirable, they can be incorporated into a system of optimal sanctions that gives 
independent weight to party autonomy. See supra section I.B. To the extent they claim that 
lawyers will make mistakes about whether conduct is undesirable or whether the client, if ad-
vised, will engage in it, they imply that full advice is more likely to produce desirable than 
undesirable conduct. 
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heavily sanctioned. Such a party will often be victimized by an oppo-
nent who understands and acts upon the real rules. 
If society is not prepared to invest what is required to deter the 
wrongful conduct of those who are already knowledgeable, fairness 
may require allowing both parties to learn and act upon the real rules 
of the game. We might tentatively state this disturbing principle in 
this way: when (1) undesirable litigation conduct is not sanctionable, 
or, though technically sanctionable, is not in fact sanctioned, and (2) 
one can confidently predict that one party, given its incentives and 
level of knowledge, will engage in such conduct, then depriving the 
opposing party of knowledge that would enable him to engage in com-
parable conduct is unfair. 
This same principle can sometimes apply to advice about primary 
conduct. For example, suppose two sellers get advice that lowers their 
expected antitrust sanctions for a merger that will give them monop-
oly power and allow them to raise prices. In those circumstances, a 
group of buyers may have a fairness claim to advice that lowers their 
expected antitrust sanctions for forming an anticompetitive buying as-
sociation that will give them countervailing market power. 
Common sense and common morality both suggest that this "fair 
fight" principle has limits. Because in its pure form the principle rests 
largely upon an intuition that equal treatment is inherently fairer, 
rather than upon any discernable improvement in social welfare, its 
normative force seems relatively weak. It hardly justifies advice that 
results in harm to nonparties or to those who are not engaging in un-
desirable conduct that injures the party. It also may not justify advice 
that will lead to plainly wrongful conduct, such as perjury or bribery. 
Most important, the principle does not apply if sanctions for the oppo-
nent's undesirable conduct are available and reasonably effective, be-
cause then the first premise for the application of the principle fails. 
This will often be the case when, as the second premise requires, one 
can confidently predict the opponent's undesirable conduct. If the op-
ponent's predictably undesirable conduct remains effectively unsanc-
tioned, then a reform in sanctions would ordinarily seem justified. 
Nonetheless, the fair fight principle might justify a variety of ad-
vice about sanctions that causes parties to engage in undesirable but 
underdeterred conduct. Fair fight arguments may, in fact, often ex-
tend beyond fairness. For example, in the countervailing power exam-
ple, forming the buying association may be a "second-best" solution 
that will result in more efficient prices and outputs than would result if 
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only the sellers had monopoly power.129 Likewise, consider again the 
obligation to tell the whole truth. Now assume that the tribunal has 
already adjusted sanctions to reflect the general understanding among 
litigants that information should not be volunteered but has not ad-
justed sanctions to compensate for the fact that one of the litigants 
does not have legal advice. Given these assumptions, the tribunal will 
often assume that the unadvised litigant is not volunteering informa-
tion, even when she in fact is being forthcoming. In such cases the 
unadvised litigant has more than a fairness claim to advice: she can 
claim that more accurate adjudication will result if both parties have 
advice that corrects overestimations of sanctions for undesirable with-
holding than if only the opponent does. 
In short, if an opponent predictably engages in undesirable con-
duct, ordinarily undesirable primary or evidentiary behavior - such 
as anticompetitive combinations or withholding information - may 
become desirable. In these circumstances the desirability of advice 
that lowers or corrects overestimations of sanctions for the conduct in 
question is not paradoxical: the advice is desirable because the ostensi- · 
bly undesirable conduct is in fact desirable. 130 
B. The Overdeterrence Problem with Restricting Undesirable Advice 
Traditional regulation of legal advice allows much advice with un-
desirable behavioral consequences. Lawyers cannot "counsel a client 
to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is crimi-
nal or fraudulent." 131 But the professional rules permit lawyers to ad-
vise clients whose conduct is not known to be criminal or fraudulent, 
no matter what the likelihood that the advice will cause undesirable 
conduct.132 This bright-line rule encompasses both neutral "advice" 
about the scope of sanctionability or the level of expected sanctions 
129. See generally PHILLIP AREEDA & LOUIS KAPLOW, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS: 
PROBLEMS, TEXT, CASES 40-42, 195 & n.24, 223 n.46 (4th ed. 1988) (discussing countervailing 
power and second best theory). 
130. This insight turns out to be at the core of many defenses of deceptive lawyer tactics in 
litigation. See, e.g., Simon, supra note 1, at 1100-02, 1108 (arguing that the lawyer should be free 
to use deceptive tactics when it would promote an informed resolution of the case). 
131. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule l.2(d) (1992). The formulation of 
the prohibition on assistance in the Model Code may be more restrictive, stating that a lawyer 
"shall not •.. [c]ounsel or assist his client in conduct that the lawyer knows to be illegal or 
fraudulent." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(7) (1980) (empha· 
sis added); see also MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-5 (1980) ("A lawyer 
should never encourage or aid his client to commit criminal acts or counsel his client on how to 
violate the law and avoid punishment."). · 
132. Lawyers have some freedom not to provide advice, either by declining to accept a client, 
negotiating express limitations on the scope of the representation, MODEL RULES OF PROFES· 
SIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2 (c) (1992), or withdrawing if the lawyer "reasonably believes" the 
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and more active "counsel or assistance" designed to reduce expected 
sanctions. 
For conduct "known" to be a crime or fraud, the professional rules 
eschew a bright-line approach. Although forbidden from "counsel-
ing" or "assisting," the lawyer remains obliged to provide full advice. 
But the line between forbidden assistance and required advice is fuzzy. 
At one extreme, clearly a lawyer can state that the contemplated con-
duct is unlawful and need not automatically withdraw even if the cli-
ent insists on engaging in the conduct.133 Equally clearly, at the other 
extreme, a lawyer may not physically assist in the consummation of 
the criminal or fraudulent act.134 In between, the rules purport to rec-
ognize a "critical distinction between presenting an analysis of legal 
aspects of questionable conduct and recommending the means by 
which a crime or fraud might be committed with impunity."135 When 
clients can readily infer the forbidden "means" from the permitted 
"analysis," however, the distinction becomes obscure both in theory 
and practice.136 The essential structure of these obligations is the 
same for litigation as for counseling.131 
client's proposed conduct to be "criminal or fraudulent" or finds it "repugnant or imprudent." 
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.16 (b)(l), (3) (1992). 
Subject to these limitations, however, the rules arguably require lawyers to provide both ad-
vice and assistance for much socially undesirable conduct. The obligation to provide full advice 
is express. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2.1 (1992) ("In representing a 
client, a lawyer shall ... render candid advice."); see also MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL 
CONDUCT Rule 1.2 cmt. (1992) ("A lawyer is required to give an honest opinion about the actual 
consequences that appear likely to result from a client's conduct."). The obligation to provide 
"assistance" within the representation is also express in the MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-lOl(A)(l) (1980) (a lawyer "shall not intentionally ... [t]ail to seek the 
lawful objectives of his client through reasonably available means permitted by law") (footnotes 
omitted), and implicit in the Model Rules, see MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 
1.1 (1992) (obligating lawyers to "provide competent representation to a client"); MODEL RULES 
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (b) (1992) (obligating lawyers to avoid any conflict of 
interest - including strong ethical antagonism to the client's proposed course of action - that 
"may .•. materially limit" the representation). The law of legal malpractice might also require 
such advice. See infra text accompanying notes 182-83. 
133. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., How Far May a Lawyer Go in Assisting a Client in Legally 
Wrongful Conduct?, 35 U. MIAMI L. REv. 669, 671 (1981) ("The law clearly sanctions providing 
... simple, unsuggestive advice .... "). Withdrawal would be required only if continued involve-
ment would violate a professional rule. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.16 
(1992). 
134. Hazard, supra note 133, at 671 (stating that assistance clearly includes the "lawyer's 
physical execution of a purpose that the client would like to realize but cannot or will not actu-
ally execute himself"). 
135. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2 cmt. (1992). 
136. See supra text accompanying note 51; WOLFRAM, supra note 50, § 13.3.2, at 695 
("[T)he nature of that critical distinction is not made clear."); Charles Wolfram, Mapping the 
Minefield: The Applicable Ethics Rules and Conflicting Duties in THE ATIORNEY CLIENT RE-
LATIONSHIP, supra note 55, at 53, 67 ("[O]nly the most murky guidance on [the divide between 
counseling and facilitation] is given in reported authority."). 
137. For example, Model Rules 3.3 and 3.4(a), (b), which deal with advice and assistance to 
evidentiary conduct, prohibit only knowing assistance in presenting false evidence or in the un-
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Both academic and regulatory critics of the profession argue that 
the traditional rules permit too much undesirable legal advice. 138 For 
those who take that view, there are two central regulatory possibilities. 
The first strategy, which we have discussed extensively in our earlier 
article, 139 is to establish bright-line rules keyed to aspects of the law-
yer-client relationship that can be confidently observed at low cost, 
rather than to the content and significance of advice in the particular 
case. These rules intentionally sweep more broadly than the prohibi-
tion of advice that knowingly assists crime or fraud on the basis of a 
generalization about the likely behavioral effects of advice. Examples 
of such rules include small claims court rules forbidding the use of a 
lawyer, 14-0 rules restricting the amounts that actors can pay for ad-
vice, 141 sequestration orders prohibiting consultation between a wit-
ness and his counsel during breaks in cross-examination, 142 and rules 
governing the existence, invocation, and waiver of the right to counsel 
in criminal cases.143 
As our discussion in Part I shows, such rules are cheap to enforce 
and easy to comply with. But, as that discussion also indicates and as 
our earlier article shows in detail, because the rules are based on fea-
tures of the lawyer-client relationship that relate only loosely to the 
social value of the advice given, they run severe risks of overdeterrence 
unless carefully tailored. 144 It is therefore understandable that their 
use has been relatively limited. 
lawful destruction or fabrication of evidence. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 
Rules 3.3, 3.4(a), (b) (1992). 
138. See, e.g., LUBAN, supra note 9, at 160-61 (arguing that lawyers should "dissociate them-
selves from projects that are immoral" even when professional rules would permit continued 
representation); Simon, supra note l, at 1096 (arguing that current norms "authorize or require a 
lawyer to act in a way that ... frustrates the most legally appropriate resolution of the matter"). 
Federal regulatory agencies such as the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Office of 
Thrift Supervision have expressed similar objections to the present professional rules, and 
adopted alternative rules or practices. See, e.g., In re Carter & Johnson, Exchange Act Release 
No. 17,597, [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 82,847 (Feb. 28, 1981) [hereinaf-
ter Carter & Johnson]; Order to Cease and Desist and For Affirmative Relief, In re Fishbein, 
OTS AP-92-24 (Mar. 11, 1992) [hereinafter Kaye, Scholer Order]. 
139. Bundy & Elhauge, supra note 33, at 396-401, 413-19. 
140. Id. at 396-97 (discussing such restrictions). 
141. Caplin & Drysdale v. United States, 491 U.S. 617 (1989) (criminal forfeiture which 
effectively reduced amount that criminal defendant could pay his lawyer does not violate Sixth 
Amendment); Walters v. National Assn. of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305 (1985) (limiting 
the amount which government benefits claimants could pay their lawyers is consistent with due 
process); Bundy & Elhauge, supra note 33, at 398-401 (analyzing such restrictions). 
142. Perry v. Leeke, 488 U.S. 272 (1989) (upholding such a restriction); see Bundy & 
Elhauge, supra note 33, at 413-17. 
143. See Bundy & Elhauge, supra note 33, at 418-19 & nn.273-77 (analyzing the effects of 
such doctrines). 
144. For an extended discussion of how the risks of overdeterrence limit the use of bright-line 
restrictions upon ex ante advice to a testifying client about what to say in court, see id. at 413-17. 
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Not surprisingly, then, many academic and regulatory critics of 
the profession are drawn to a strategy of restricting advice based on a 
case-by-case assessment of its consequences. They would reform pro-
fessional codes and ethical norms to make prohibitions on advice and 
assistance broader and more open-textured in three distinct ways. 
First, they would expand the crime-fraud exception to encompass ad-
vice regarding a broader range of client conduct, including conduct 
that is unlawful or simply socially undesirable.145 Second, they would 
impose liability based not just on attorney knowledge, but also on 
recklessness or, in some versions, failure to conduct a reasonable in-
quiry.146 Third, they would require that lawyers go beyond refusing to 
assist undesirable client conduct and actually take reasonable meas-
ures to prevent it.147 For ease of expression, we will refer to the com-
bination of such expanded legal prohibitions on giving undesirable 
advice as a "general standard."148 
In this section, we assess this debate between the profession and its 
critics and analyze the effects of requiring attorneys to deny advice 
when it seems likely to have undesirable consequences. 149 We begin in 
145. Those endorsing a standard that approaches social desirability include LUBAN, supra 
note 9, at 173·74, and Simon, supra note 1, at 1093. Regulatory agencies tend to focus on lawful-
ness - defined in terms of the spirit or purpose of the law - without regard to whether the 
conduct is a crime or fraud. See, e.g., Kaye, Scholer Order, supra note 138, 11 15(c) (forbidding 
law firm from acting as counsel in a matter in which the client is "violating any applicable federal 
banking statutes or regulations, including by attempting to evade any such regulations by elevat-
ing form over substance"). A similar statutory standard will apply to lawyers sued under the 
Financial Institutions Recovery, Reform and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA), which per-
mits imposition of liability for knowing or reckless participation "in any unsafe or unsound finan-
cial practice which is likely to cause more than minimal financial loss." Pub. L. No. 101-73, 
§ 204(t)(6), 103 Stat. 183, 193 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1813(u)(4) (Supp. IV 1992)). 
146. See, e.g., Simon, supra note 1, at 1097 (advocating denials of advice when the "lawyer 
... [has] good reason to recognize" that an unjust result will follow from providing it); Kaye, 
Scholer Order, supra note 138, 11 l(b) ("'knowledge' shall mean actual knowledge or reckless 
disregard of the facts."); id. at 11 12 (imposing a variety of due diligence requirements). The 
prime example of a diligence obligation for counselors is, of course, that imposed on counsel in a 
public offering under § 11 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1933. 
147. In re Carter, Exchange Act Release No. 17,597, [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. 
Rep. (CCH) 1182,847, at 84,172 (Feb. 28, 1981) (holding that lawyer must take reasonable meas-
ures to prevent unlawful conduct by client); Simon, supra note 1, at 1098, 1100 (lawyer who 
concludes that advice will result in injustice must take "reasonably available actions" to promote 
justice and prevent injustice). 
148. We recognize that this broadly drawn contrast between a narrow version of the crime-
fraud rule and the general standard described in text brushes over many intermediate positions. 
We do this because our purpose is to spell out the implications of a shift toward a general stan-
dard, rather than to defend any particular place along the line. For examples of intermediate 
views focused on the obligations of lawyers for insured financial institutions, compare Wilkins, 
supra note 8, at 1151-1215 (tending toward a general standard) with Jackson, supra note 53, at 
1055-61 (tending toward the normal crime-fraud rules). 
149. Other sorts of rules may effectively restrict the flow of advice, including: (1) rules gov-
erning the formation of the attorney-client relationship, such as those regulating client solicita-
tion and advertising; (2) rules governing the financing of representation, such as those concerning 
attorney fees, the sale of claims to lawyers, loans and advances to clients, and public subsidies for 
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section III.B.1 by considering these proposals for a general standard 
governing the provision of legal advice. We conclude that, although 
such a general standard would indeed reduce the underdeterrence of 
undesirable advice, it would also raise grave problems of overdeter-
rence: preventing or rendering unaffordable much desirable advice. 
Moreover, this overdeterrence would disproportionately affect clients 
who are poor, distressed, or inexperienced; who have one-shot or low-
stakes claims; or who are from racial or socioeconomic backgrounds 
different from their lawyers. We then consider in section III.B.2 
whether such a general standard would be less problematic if it was 
embodied in an ethical norm - rather than a legal prohibition -
against giving undesirable advice. Surprisingly, we conclude that the 
case for such an ethical norm is not clearly better, and in some re-
spects weaker, than that for the legal prohibition. To the extent such 
an ethical norm were effective, it too would raise important overdeter-
rence problems, as well as undermining the standard of care for giving 
advice under the law of legal malpractice. Finally, in section III.B.3, 
we reconsider the traditional rule in light of the over- and underdeter-
rence problem. The traditional rule, we conclude, may well optimize 
over- and underdeterrence of advice by triggering either a general 
standard (in crime-fraud cases) or a bright-line rule (outside the crime-
fraud cases), depending on whether, given the circumstances, 
overdeterrence or underdeterrence seems the more pressing problem. 
1. A Legal Prohibition on Undesirable Advice 
Proposals for general standards forbidding lawyers from offering 
advice leading to undesirable consequences have suffered critique on 
many grounds. Common critiques are that such general standards 
legal advice; and (3) rules limiting the right to provide legal advice, such as those governing 
admission to the profession and the unauthorized practice of law. Although such rules restrict 
advice, none at present reflects an express policy of suppressing advice on account of its behav-
ioral consequences. Some have argued, however, that some such rules were in the past intended, 
at least in part, to deter selectively particular kinds of advice, principally advice deemed likely to 
increase the likelihood of claims by personal injury, consumer, and civil rights plaintiffs. See, 
e.g., JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN 
AMERICA 41-50 (1976) (arguing that rules on advertising, solicitation, acquiring an interest in 
litigation, and division of fees among lawyers in the early twentieth century were designed to 
favor corporate clients); Philip Shuchman, Ethics and Legal Ethics: The Propriety of the Canons 
as a Group Moral Code, 37 GEO.WASH. L. REV. 244, 262-66 (1968) (same). The desirability and 
fairness of selective transmission in those settings seems doubtful but in any event is beyond the 
scope of our discussion here. 
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would be unenforceable150 and infringe party autonomy.151 We do not 
wish to recanvass this debate, other than to note that proponents of a 
more general standard have responded to these and other traditional 
critiques more persuasively than one might suppose.152 Rather, we 
want to emphasize an independent problem with general standards 
prohibiting undesirable advice that proponents have not addressed: 
the inevitable propensity of such general standards to overdeter desira-
ble forms of advice.153 
Thus, without addressing them directly, we put the traditional ar-
guments, and responses to them, aside. With regard to enforceability, 
we assume that, even if undesirable advice cannot be eliminated, some 
of it could be deterred by legal sanctions under a standard prohibiting 
undesirable advice. We further assume that, despite the value of au-
tonomy, some advised misconduct falling short of known crime or 
fraud remains socially undesirable, if only because such misconduct 
infringes on the autonomy of others. On these assumptions, we think 
that overdeterrence concerns provide an important reason to be wary 
of general standards that seek to prohibit undesirable forms of advice. 
The risk that a general standard would overdeter desirable advice 
flows from two basic sources: (1) increased compliance costs; and (2) 
increased expected sanctions for providing desirable advice. A general 
standard will significantly increase compliance costs for several rea-
sons. The due diligence obligation under such a standard would re-
quire more ~xtensive investigation in a broader range of cases. 
Moreover, a general standard makes a broader range of information 
potentially relevant to attorney liability. When the issue is whether 
the advice will lead the client to do something undesirable, such infor-
mation will include what the client knows, how the client would act 
with and without legal advice, the consequences of those courses of 
action, and, under broader formulations of the standard, which of the 
two courses of action is more socially desirable. When the issue is the 
150. See, e.g., James J. White, Machz"avelli and the Bar: Ethical Limitations on Lying in 
Negotiation, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 926, 937-38 (discussing proposed requirements of fair-
ness and candor in negotiation). 
151. See, e.g., Donagan, supra note 128, at 133; Stephen Pepper, The Lawyer's Amoral Role: 
A Defense, a Problem and Some Possibilities, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 613. 
152. See, e.g., Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1 (1988); 
Rhode, supra note 127; Simon, supra note 1, at 1119-44. 
153. Many considerations advanced here apply in any gatekeeping regime in which liability 
is imposed on a provider of goods or services in order to improve the behavior of the customer. 
For general discussion, see Kraakman, supra note 33, at 74-81 (discussing overdeterrence 
problems). For recent analyses of lawyers' obligations applying a gatekeeper analysis, see, for 
example, Jackson, supra note 53; David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. 
L. REV. 801 (1992). 
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desirability of advice that assists the client in lowering expected sanc-
tions, the lawyer will also want to assess issues of access to informa-
tion and the motives and legal competence of possible observers.154 
Collecting and evaluating this information is costly, and those costs 
will inevitably increase legal fees. Increased fees, in tum, reduce the 
advice bought and given, including much desirable legal advice. 
More important, even a lawyer who diligently endeavored to pro-
vide only desirable advice would face substantial expected legal sanc-
tions under a general standard. This would be especially true if the 
standard embodies a nebulous standard of social desirability - like 
promoting "justice"155 or avoiding "immoral" projects156 - for then 
the lawyer must guess which standard of social desirability the tribu-
nal will adopt in her case. 
But even if the general standard stipulated some concrete measure 
of social desirability - say Posnerian economic efficiency, Rawlsian 
distributive justice, or the substantive norms underlying current law 
- the risk of legal sanctions would remain. Lawyers' judgments 
about whether their advice meets the stipulated standard of desirabil-
ity will often be uncertain or prove inaccurate. Lawyers will have to 
make predictions of how the advice will affect their client's behavior 
and how a tribunal will judge the effects of their advice. The latter will 
be particularly difficult because ex post adjudication of the desirability 
of advice will be hard to predict and often inaccurate. The tribunal 
will likely have incomplete information because often there will be no 
physical evidence about, or disinterested witnesses to, the advice given. 
Moreover, a general standard will exacerbate the risk of inaccuracy 
because such a standard is more manipulable and heavily dependent in 
application on contextual elements of the situation that may be poorly 
captured in an ex post inquiry. Thus, even well-motivated and compe-
tent tribunals will often have a hard time reaching an accurate deter-
mination whether to sanction. 157 Such uncertainty will often lead 
lawyers to forgo desirable advice for fear of legal sanctions. 
154. William Simon, for example, anticipates that litigation counsel would ordinarily con· 
duct such an assessment of the competence of the opponent and the tribunal before giving litiga-
tion advice. See Simon, supra note 1, at 1100 (suggesting that the lawyer has an obligation to 
assess the risk of institutional failure). Similarly, David Wilkins argues that Kaye, Scholer had 
an obligation to assess whether the effectiveness of its opponent, the Federal Home Loan Bank 
Board, had been impaired by "political pressures," and, if it detected such an impairment, to 
moderate its advocacy accordingly. Wilkins, supra note 8, at 1194-95. 
155. Id. at 1090. 
156. LUBAN, supra note 9, at 160-61. 
157. Cf. Kraakman, supra note 33, at 73 ("Equally important, both courts and gatekeepers 
are likely to err in rough proportion to the complexity of misconduct or the ambiguity of the 
law."). 
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Infrequent detection of prohibited advice may worsen the problem 
of overdeterrence. Infrequent detection is likely for several reasons. 
Accurate information requires full monitoring of lawyers' activities, 
including their interactions with clients, a prohibitively costly enter-
prise.158 Even if there were no formal rules requiring attorneys to 
keep silent about their clients' affairs, 159 few cases of wrongdoing 
would be reported. If the lawyer has provided advice that prevents 
desirable conduct, the matter will often never come to light. If the 
lawyer has given advice that encourages undesirable conduct, neither 
lawyer nor client have any incentive to say anything unless the client 
actually engages in the harmful activity, is caught, and concludes that 
the advantages of attacking the lawyer exceed the advantages of mak-
ing common cause with him.160 Even if this occurs, the lawyer's 
greater legal sophistication may often allow him to obscure what actu-
ally took place or to dominate a "swearing match" with the client. 
Infrequent detection and inaccurate adjudication combine to cre-
ate a difficult problem of sanctioning policy. Infrequent detection 
might seem to call for severe, perhaps even career-threatening, sanc-
tions in cases where improper advice is detected.161 But, given the 
inaccuracy of adjudication under a general standard of social desirabil-
ity, this approach will potentially subject a great deal of desirable ad-
vice to very severe sanctions. 
The problem of overdeterrence under a general standard would op-
erate across the full spectrum of advice, but its extent would vary de-
pending on the kinds of lawyers, clients, and legal issues involved. 
158. Obviously monitoring would be very costly simply as a matter of information gathering. 
The cost would be greater, of course, to the extent that monitoring also violated basic privacy 
values or deterred desirable advice. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. Full analysis of 
confidentiality rules is beyond the scope of our present discussion except to note that, under an 
open-textured standard, even full information about the interaction between lawyer and client 
would not eliminate the risk of mistaken sanctioning. For an analysis of confidentiality in litiga-
tion, see Bundy & Elhauge, supra note 33, at 401-13. 
159. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1992) (forbidding dis-
closure of information "relating to the representation"). 
160. See Wilkins, supra note 153, at 834 (noting that the client seldom has incentive to tum 
in its "partner in crime"). Professor Wilkins' analysis of the question of who should exercise 
regulatory authority over lawyers echoes many of the themes explored here, particularly the 
different effects of lawyer regulation designed to curb excesses of lawyer zeal on different classes 
of clients. But his analysis does not focus on the issue as it arises in the context of formulating 
rules for the provision oflegal advice because he assumes that different regulatory authorities will 
generally enforce the same set of rules. His analysis of the Kaye, Scholer matter, however, ex-
pressly considers the relevance of client type to the content of professional regulation. Wilkins, 
supra note 8, at 1206-09 (discussing how sophisticated clients can avoid overdeterrence). 
161. For example, the remedy obtained in the Kaye, Scholer litigation barred two lawyers 
from the firm from representing regulated savings and loan clients in perpetuity. In re Fishbein, 
OTS AP-92-25 (Department of Treasury 1992) (order of prohibition and disbarment); In re 
Katzman, OTS AP-92-26 (Department of Treasury 1992) (same). 
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Where a significant possibility exists that lawyers would mistakenly be 
assessed severe sanctions, lawyers who are risk averse or who have 
high risk-bearing costs would be more severely deterred from giving 
desirable advice.162 
Some clients would also experience greater overdeterrence than 
others. Because increased compliance costs would make legal advice 
more expensive, clients with less wealth would have to forgo more de-
sirable advice, and thus suffer greater overdeterrence, than wealthier 
clients. Clients unfamiliar to the lawyer are also likely to experience 
greater overdeterrence. When a client is unfamiliar, the lawyer knows 
less about what the client knows, how advice will influence the client's 
conduct, and the benefits to the client of engaging in the conduct. Un-
familiar clients therefore increase both the costs of complying with a 
general standard and the residual risk of being held liable even if one 
has complied. Overdeterrence should therefore be less severe for cli-
ents whom the lawyer has represented before, whom he knows from 
other social settings, or with whom he shares common traits or exper-
iences. Overdeterrence will be more severe for clients who are onetime 
users of the legal system or are of a different race or socioeconomic 
background than the lawyer.163 
One can also expect greater overdeterrence for clients who cannot 
effectively bargain for advice, whether due to distress (so that they 
lack the time and energy to shop for a lawyer), inexperience, or inabil-
ity to offer repeat business. Such clients are less likely to recognize 
when they have been denied desirable advice and less able to make 
credible threats to take present or future business elsewhere. 164 
Overdeterrence may be particularly severe if, as seems plausible, there 
is a significant overlap between the universes of risk-averse lawyers, 
less wealthy clients, unfamiliar clients, and clients who cannot bargain 
for advice. 
Overdeterrence is also more likely for certain types of legal issues. 
Its impact is likely to be more severe for small-stakes claims or issues, 
where increased compliance costs often dwarf the value of the advice. 
Overdeterrence will also be greater when the lawfulness of the client's 
162. See Jackson, supra note 53, at 1065 & n.67 (discussing risk aversion among lawyers). 
163. See id. at 1056 & n.139 (risky savings and loans denied advice); Kraakman, supra note 
33, at 77 (rejection of risky clients). 
164. One should not think of this as simply a problem of agency costs that conflict of interest 
rules can control. Recall that the decision to refuse a client or to withdraw from representation 
on moral grounds is essentially discretionary. Overdeterrence may therefore be reflected not 
primarily in failures to provide advice within a lawyer-client relationship, but rather in failures to 
commence or continue relationships. Moreover, within relationships between lawyers and one-
shot clients, conflict of interest rules are significantly underenforced, largely on account of low 
rates of client detection. Wilkins, supra note 153, at 822-30. 
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conduct is uncertain. Under standards framed in terms of justice or 
social desirability, overdeterrence will also increase when the lawyer's 
professional competence does not enable him to determine with confi-
dence whether the client's conduct will be socially desirable. Classi-
cally the lawyer's legal training and experience equip her to determine 
whether particular conduct is sanctionable and, sometimes, the level of 
expected sanctions. When sanctionability or the level of. expected 
sanctions are weak proxies for social desirability, that training is un-
likely to provide her with any special advantage in evaluating the con-
duct. In general, we might expect a weak correlation between 
sanctionability and social desirability when the applicable rules do not 
seek to prohibit conduct outright, but rather to price conduct by mak-
ing the actor internalize its social costs. 165 The desirability of such 
conduct turns not on whether the conduct is sanctionable or on the 
level of expected sanctions, but on whether its private and public bene-
fits exceed its private and public costs, an issue on which the lawyer 
may well doubt her competence. 
The potential differential impact in deterring advice also has dis-
turbing implications for the provision of advice with undesirable be-
havioral consequences that is nonetheless justified on fairness 
grounds. 166 Consider first the class of cases in which fairness calls for 
advice notwithstanding the risk that it will deter desirable conduct. 
When the law is contested, or the legal rules price conduct rather than 
prohibit it, actors will often face severe expected sanctions despite 
their correct - or at least reasonable - belief that their proposed 
conduct is socially desirable. As we have seen, however, those condi-
tions also increase the likelihood of overdeterring advice under a gen-
eral standard. Such a standard therefore increases the risk that actors 
will be unfairly sanctioned for desirable conduct. That risk will be still 
more grave for clients with limited resources, unfamiliar clients, and 
clients who cannot effectively bargain for advice. The greater 
overdeterrence of advice for those classes of clients may also create 
troubling problems under the fair fight principle when such clients op-
pose parties who do not suffer from those disadvantages. 167 
165. This distinction was apparently introduced to the law-and-economics literature by Rob-
ert Cooter. See Robert Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 CoLUM. L. REV. 1523 (1984). The 
distinction has recently been strongly pressed in the recent work of John Coffee. See John C. 
Coffee, Does "Unlawful" Mean "Criminal"?: Reflections on the Disappearing Tort/Crime Dis-
tinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193, 225-28 (1991) [hereinafter Coffee, Reflections]; 
John C. Coffee, Jr., Paradigms Lost: The Blurring of the Criminal and Civil Law Models -And 
What Can Be Done About It, 101 YALE L.J. 1875, 1876 & n.6 (1992) (describing the distinction) 
[hereinafter Coffee, Paradigms Lost]. 
166. See supra section III.A. 
167. This problem arguably has arisen under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, where 
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Accordingly, proposals for a general standard condemning unde-
sirable advice should have more appeal when clients are repeat players 
who are familiar to their lawyers and, hence, run less risk of being 
denied desirable advice on account of overdeterrence. Indeed, 
although proponents of more general standards have not explicitly rec-
ognized this overdeterrence problem, their actual positions are consis-
tent with our conclusions about the distribution of overdeterrence. 
Thus, critics of the present regime of professional ethics strongly em-
phasize its overinclusiveness as applied to sophisticated business enti-
ties, 168 for whom overdeterrence is less problematic. And proponents 
of more general standards often express reluctance to extend their ap-
proach to cases involving unfamiliar or unsophisticated clients, 169 for 
whom we would predict greater overdeterrence. In short, the viability 
(if any) of a general standard policing undesirable advice may depend 
on limiting its application to settings in which all or most clients are 
familiar, sophisticated repeat players with relatively large economic 
stakes in the issues. Proceedings before federal regulatory agencies 
like the SEC and OTS, where such standards have been proposed, 
might arguably be such settings.11o 
Specialized regulatory settings may also influence other undesir-
able effects of a general standard. First, if lawyers and regulators are 
both genuinely expert in the underlying subject matter, that expertise 
may reduce both the degree of uncertainty about how general stan-
dards should be interpreted and applied and the residual risk of error 
in doing so.171 Second, if such settings involve repeated interactions 
among a well-defined community of lawyers and regulators, those in-
teractions may over time generate relatively firm understandings about 
the meaning and application of such standards. Third, such forums 
may sometimes permit low cost increases in the rate of enforcement, 
evidence suggests that sanctions directed at lawyers and litigants have deterred individual plain· 
tiffs - and particularly civil rights plaintiffs - more severely than organizational defendants. 
Lawrence Marshall et al., The Use and Impact of Rule 11, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 943, 970-75 
(1992). 
168. See Rhode, supra note 127, at 607-08; William H. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: 
Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978 Wis. L. REV. 29, 109. 
169. See LUBAN, supra note 9, at 66 (suggesting that traditional notions of zealous advocacy 
should apply for defendants in criminal cases and for parties in civil cases when the client is 
much less powerful than his opponent); Simon, supra note I, at 1084 (limiting his approach to 
civil practice and excluding criminal cases). 
170. See Wilkins, supra note 8, at 1207 (arguing that savings and loan institutions are "so· 
phisticated repeat users of legal services" who can protect themselves against costs associated 
with defensive lawyering). 
171. Cf. Kraakman, supra note 33, at 83 (arguing that the expertise of the securities bar and 
underwriting community has helped to "focus" due diligence obligations under the federal secur-
ities laws). 
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which in tum may make it possible to maintain deterrence while re-
ducing actual sanctions toward the level of social harm, rather than 
some multiple thereof. This should reduce overdeterrence due to risk 
aversion or high risk-bearing costs.172 
2. An Ethical Prohibition on Undesirable Advice 
In lieu of a general legal prohibition on undesirable advice, some 
critics suggest propounding a comparable rule as ap. ethical norm, 
drilled or socialized into lawyers during law school or by professional 
associations and interactions.173 Generally this is presented as a more 
modest, and easier to justify, proposal than the legal reform just con-
sidered. Again, we put aside questions about practicality, such as 
whether such socialization could be sufficiently effective to change 
legal practice. Rather, we focus on the question whether, if effective, 
such an ethical norm would have desirable consequences overall, or at 
least more desirable consequences than a legally imposed standard. 
Such proposals for a new ethical or professional norm of avoiding 
undesirable advice must contemplate that socialization will overcome 
the lure of legal fees in one of two ways. First, social sanctions, such 
as professional disparagement, may coerce attorneys into complying 
with the norm despite financial incentives to the contrary. Second, 
legal education or professional training may instill the norm so deeply 
into lawyers that they will comply ·automatically despite contrary fi-
nancial incentives174 or will experience sufficient internal rewards from 
compliance (or guilt from violations) to overcome those financial in-
centives.175 Such ethical norms can be effective in accomplishing their 
stated aim - namely denying advice when it would lead to undesir-
able consequences - only if lawyers complying with the ethical norm 
have sufficient market power that clients seeking undesirable advice 
cannot simply tum to alternative lawyers with lower or different ethi-
cal standards. 
With regard to social sanctions, our analysis parallels that in the 
last section. Like legal sanctions for undesirable advice, social stan-
dards will impose higher compliance costs, with disproportionate ef-
172. Cf Jackson, supra note 53, at 1063-67 (discussing the relation between enforcement 
rates, sanction levels, and overdeterrence). 
173. See, e.g., LUBAN, supra note 9, at 158-59; Simon, supra note 1, at 1084 (presenting as an 
alternative thesis that his proposed duty .to "do justice" could be incorporated into individual 
ethical judgment rather than professional rules). 
174. Cf Kornhauser, supra note 39. 
175. See Ronald S. Gilson, The Devolution of the Legal Profession: A Demand Side Perspec-
tive, 49 Mo. L. REV. 869, 886-89 (1990) (arguing and collecting sources to support point that 
lawyers can be motivated or socialized to choose virtue over income). 
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fects on less wealthy, less familiar, and less sophisticated clients. Also 
like legal sanctions, social sanctions will be uncertain and often im-
posed inaccurately. Indeed, social sanctions probably will be even 
more nebulous than general legal standards, in part because social 
judgments express no uniform rationale or binding precedent. More-
over, because social condemnation will often rest on superficial judg-
ments and casual observation, the imposition of social sanctions is 
more likely to be inaccurate even if the social norm were perfectly 
specified. A familiar example is the fear that individuals who have 
been judged guilty by the media would find it difficult to secure coun-
sel. If the fear of social sanctions can overcome the desire for income 
sufficiently to deter undesirable advice, that same fear of social sanc-
tions would also deter lawyers from giving many forms of advice that 
would in fact be desirable. 
Distributional problems will also accompany social sanctions 
applied by members of the profession. Not only will the unfamiliar, 
one-shot client seem more risky to the advising lawyer (and more 
costly to investigate), but those same characteristics are also likely to 
make the client unfamiliar to the members of the profession generally, 
thus decreasing the accuracy of the social sanctioning process. One 
might thus expect professional social sanctions disproportionately to 
overdeter advice to clients who come from a different socioeconomic 
background than their lawyers or who have one-shot or nonroutine 
claims. 176 
Social sanctions, however, do have at least one potential advantage 
over legally enforced sanctions: social interactions may be more likely 
than legal rules to detect and punish the giving of undesirable advice. 
In practice settings where lawyers interact frequently and reputational 
networks are strong, a lawyer may fear the condemnation of legal 
peers who can observe his behavior far more than the unlikely pros-
pect of a disciplinary hearing. This greater ease of detection can make 
social sanctions more effective, even though far less severe when im-
posed, than legal sanctions. We thus do not argue that social sanc-
tions are in any sense an inferior means of regulating undesirable 
forms of advice - just that they raise problems of overdeterrence sim-
ilar to those raised by legal sanctions. 
Internalized professional norms present a more mixed picture. 
Under this approach, the well-socialized lawyer will be self-monitoring 
176. Indeed, some have criticized professional rules regulating legal advertising or soliciting 
clients, acquiring an interest in litigation, and fee divisions among lawyers as intended to deter 
selectively advice that increases the likelihood of claims by personal injury, consumer, or civil 
rights plaintiffs. See supra note 149. Such clients tend to be one-shot and often unfamiliar. 
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and self-sanctioning, which reduces overdeterrence problems stem-
ming from low detection rates and inaccurate sanctioning. Compli-
ance costs should, however, continue to overdeter desirable advice, 
both generally and with respect to less wealthy, less familiar, and less 
experienced clients. 
The open-textured nature of the standard, however, may mean 
that underdeterrence is not effectively corrected for clients who can 
shop for advice. To understand this observation, we must focus on 
what sort of norm, precisely, would be instilled. Suppose, for example, 
the norm is quite general and standardlike, requiring that each lawyer 
balance his client's interests against the interests of others or achieve 
the most just result in each case. 177 Even well-socialized, conscien-
tious lawyers applying such an open-ended norm will have a high er-
ror rate around the mean of social desirability. Accordingly, clients 
who can shop for advice will often obtain the advice they want by 
picking another lawyer or law firm when the first denies them advice. 
Moreover, to the extent such a standard invites lawyers to make their 
own moral judgments without reference to external standards of social 
desirability, different lawyers attempting to comply with the standard 
will (accurately!) reach sharply different conclusions, thus increasing 
sophisticated clients' ability to shop for the advice they want. The de 
facto sti!ndard is, in short, likely to vary too much to be effective. 
Moreover, the inevitable tendency for self-interest to cloud factual and 
moral judgment will likely induce lawyers to underestimate the unde-
sirability of advice, particularly as they see business migrate to those 
with laxer ethical standards. 
Effective internalized ethical norms, then, must have sufficiently 
uniform content and application that clients lack ready alternatives. 
Since internal moral adjudication is private and decentralized, such 
uniformity can only be achieved if the instilled norms are rulelike, 
having broad, relatively precise application. Such rulelike internalized 
norms might resist the race to the ethical bottom. But, because they 
must be framed broadly, they raise inevitable problems of over- and 
underinclusion, and thus over- and underdeterrence, because they 
would not allow for contextual moral judgment. 
As a more modest strategy a law firm might endeavor to exploit its 
own market power to cease providing certain clients with undesirable 
advice under an ethical norm particular to that firm. Law firms are 
normally too small to have market power in any general legal market. 
But, as Ronald Gilson has argued, often law firms do have market 
177. See generally Simon, supra note l (proposing that lawyers act to promote justice.). 
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power vis-a-vis certain clients because those clients have made rela-
tionship-specific investments in that firm. 178 Such relationship-specific 
investments will make it costly for long-term clients to switch firms 
and thus gives firms some marginal market power to withhold desira-
ble advice without losing their clients. 
But a strategy based on single-firm market power faces four severe 
problems. First, in the long run a firm that pursues such a strategy 
will have difficulty acquiring new clients and will tend to lose business 
to other expanding firms. Second, as Gilson himself has noted, the 
increasing legal sophistication of long-term business clients, in part be-
cause of the expanding role of general counsel, has given clients 
greater ability to shop effectively, reducing the availability of this strat-
egy.179 Third, because the strategy depends on repeat players, it is not 
feasible in markets dominated by one-shot clients. Finally, unless the 
firm can afford to lose the business of all clients against whom it lacks 
market power (new or sophisticated or one-shot clients), successfully 
pursuing this strategy would require distinguishing between these cli-
ents subject to the firm's market power (locked-in, unsophisticated, 
repeat playing clients) and those who are not, and then applying differ-
ent ethical norms to each set of clients. 180 Both distinguishing clients 
and especially applying dichotomous ethical norms are likely to prove 
difficult in practice. They may also give rise to new ethical problems 
stemming from the perceived need to prevent clients from learning of 
the alternate ethical standard.1s1 
At the same time that it seems unlikely to deter advice to clients 
who can shop, a fully effective, open-textured ethical standard poses 
new risks of reducing desirable advice to unsophisticated or one-shot 
clients. The risks arise from the interaction of any ethical norm with 
the law of legal malpractice, which poses an interesting dilemma. 182 
Suppose, first, that compliance with a proposed ethical standard would 
not be a defense to a client's malpractice claim that she was denied 
legal advice. Such a rule would render the ethical standard all but a 
dead letter. Lawyers who otherwise would deny lawful advice to cli-
ents on ethical grounds will not persist when threatened with malprac-
tice liability. 
178. See Gilsop, supra note 175, at 889-98. 
179. See id. at 900-03. 
180. Cf. 10 PHILLIP AREEDA ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW~ 1740 (forthcoming 1994). 
181. Cf. Mark Osiel, Lawyers as Monopolists, Aristocrats, and Entrepreneurs, 103 HARV, L. 
REV. 2009, 2016-17 (1990) (suggesting that lawyers practicing under a general standard would 
have to deceive clients). 
182. Much of the argument here also applies to the interaction of legal malpractice liability 
with a professional code that attempts to require lawyers to deny undesirable advice. 
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Alternatively, suppose that complying with the proposed ethical 
norm would be a defense to a malpractice claim. In that event, the 
ethical norm could seriously undermine the standard of care in provid-
ing advice mandated by the law of legal malpractice. The lawyer who 
failed to provide advice out of sloppiness could simply attribute the 
failure to misgivings about whether the advice would lead to socially 
undesirable consequences. Of course a tribunal might reject the law-
yer's judgment as unreasonable, but then judges and juries in malprac-
tice cases, rather than socialization and internal sanctioning 
mechanisms, would establish the effective standard of practice, rein-
troducing all the problems of over- and underdeterrence that attend ex 
post adjudication of a legal prohibition on undesirable advice.183 
Undermining the effective legal standard of care under malpractice 
law will have a different effect on different clients. For the sophisti-
cated, repeat-playing client, one doubts that the legal standard of care 
has much impact at all. Lawyers' interest in preserving their reputa-
tion for good legal work should provide a sufficient incentive for them 
to take care. But shoddy work done for unsophisticated, one-shot cli-
ents by definition has no impact on future business with the client and 
will likely have little impact on the lawyer's general reputation either. 
Again, the distributional impact of the advice forgone - through in-
creased cost, deterrence, or sloppiness - seems likely to impact unso-
phisticated or one-shot clients disproportionately.1s4 
3. The Triggering Functlon of the Traditional Crime-Fraud Line 
The disadvantages of a general legal or ethical standard seem to us 
to provide ample ground for a rule of bright-line legality for substan-
tial categories of advice, at least for unfamiliar or one-shot clients. 
The question remains why traditional professional norms draw the 
rule of bright-line legality just shy of known fraud or crime, rather 
183. This will be largely true even if the tribunals apply the subjective test, limiting their 
inquiry to whether the lawyer in fact thought the advice was undesirable. Absent a smoking gun 
- such as the lawyer's own admission - subjective intents must be determined by inferences 
that are inevitably based on some implicit understanding of what a reasonable person would have 
thought under the circumstances. 
184. Very recent work by Luban and Simon shows an emerging awareness of the potential 
effects of a discretionary ethical standard on the quality of representation provided to unsophisti-
cated, powerless parties. It also documents a divergence of their views concerning the severity of 
such effects. Compare David Luban, Are Criminal Defenders Different?, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1729, 
1757-59 (1993) (arguing that a discretionary ethical standard for "aggressive advocacy" in crimi-
nal cases should be rejected because it would encourage incompetent practice) with William H. 
Simon, Reply: Further Reflections on Libertarian Criminal Defense, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1767, 
1769-71 (1993) (discounting that risk). In this exchange, as in earlier work, neither author de-
votes any attention to the problems of overdeterrence that might result if their proposed stan-
dards were embodied in legal norms enforced through coercive sanctions. 
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than at some other point. In our view, that choice appears most plau-
sible on the assumption that the crime-fraud line accurately distin-
guishes those laws that, because they are narrowly drawn around the 
most egregious conduct, that are relatively less overinclusive and rela-
tively more worrisome in terms of underdeterrence. 185 
If crimes and frauds substantially exhaust the categories of laws 
that are narrowly drawn around highly undesirable behavior, then 
seeking to prohibit advice that facilitates undesirable conduct outside 
those categories runs a severe risk of overdeterring advice justifiable on 
behavioral or fairness grounds. For it would follow that, outside that 
category, overinclusion and overdeterrence present greater problems. 
The assumption that crime and fraud laws are relatively less over-
inclusive also helps to justify the more complex and open-textured rule 
governing the provision of advice about known crimes or frauds. Re-
call that, under this rule, advice that the conduct is unlawful is clearly 
permitted, but other types of advice are shadowed by uncertainty con-
cerning the boundary between permitted analysis and prohibited 
assistance. 186 If contemplated criminal or fraudulent conduct is al-
most always undesirable, advice that it is sanctionable will seldom 
have undesirable behavioral effects. After all, such advice should stop 
normally law-abiding clients in their tracks, regardless of the level of 
expected sanctions. Even if clients are not law abiding, learning that 
their proposed conduct is criminal or fraudulent will never increase 
the likelihood that they will engage in it. The severity of the criminal 
sanction, moreover, provides compelling fairness reasons for providing 
such advice. Conversely if crimes and frauds (and conduct bordering 
on them) are almost always undesirable, there is no social value in -
and rarely any fairness argument for - advice that allows parties to 
lower expected sanctions. A complete prohibition seems appropriate. 
On the assumption that crime and fraud laws exhibit low overin-
clusion, the indeterminate status of intermediate kinds of advice, such 
as advice about the level of expected sanctions, also seems appropriate. 
Granted, such advice can be socially desirable when the client under-
estimates expected sanctions. But, in most other respects, it appears 
uniquely dangerous. A client who expresses interest in the level of 
expected sanctions for conduct he already knows to be criminal or 
185. See Parker, supra note 32, at 759·60 nn.51-56 (collecting sources holding the view that 
criminal behavior is particularly valueless with little surrounding productive behavior to be 
overdeterred). Many believe that this is how the criminal law should operate. Coffee, Paradigms 
Lost, supra note 165, at 1876 (arguing that the criminal law should be limited to prohibiting 
conduct that society believes "lacks any social utility"). Whether it now does so in fact is more 
doubtful. See id. at 1878-82. 
186. See supra notes 131-36 and accompa~ying text. 
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fraudulent is unlikely to be law abiding. Thus, if the client overesti-
mates expected sanctions, advice will strongly increase the likelihood 
of undesirable conduct. And, because advice about the scope of sanc-
tions should provide full notice that the conduct is wrongful, there is 
no independent fairness justification for advice about the level of 
sanctions. 
It may therefore be appropriate to regulate advice about expected 
sanctions for known crime or fraud under a probabilistic standard, 
permitting such advice when it corrects underestimations of expected 
sanctions, but forbidding it when it corrects overestimations. The risk 
that such a standard will deter desirable advice is lower because, given 
the situation, less advice is desirable. Moreover, the risk of selectively 
overdeterring desirable advice to unfamiliar or unsophisticated clients 
is less, both because a client's continued interest in the level of ex-
pected sanctions provides important confirmation of her character and 
because determining the social desirability of the client's conduct no 
longer depends on a costly and potentially erroneous inquiry into the 
level of benefit to her. 
On this account, the structure of the rules on advice adopts what 
one of us has elsewhere described as a "triggering" approach. 187 A 
triggering approach is often a useful regulatory strategy when there 
are two alternative legal doctrines: one that exhibits less underdeter-
rence at the expense of greater overdeterrence, and another that exhib-
its less overdeterrence at the expense of greater underdeterrence. The 
former doctrine would be better if underdeterrence problems 
predominate; the latter would be better if overdeterrence problems 
predominate. Rather than simply choosing one of the doctrines to ap-
ply in all cases, however, sometimes the law can apply each doctrine 
selectively by employing a metarule to segregate the general class of 
cases into one class in which underdeterrence problems dominate and 
another class in which overdeterrence problems dominate. That 
metarule would then trigger the application of the first doctrine to the 
first class of cases and the second doctrine to the second class. Each 
doctrine would accordingly be focused on the sorts of cases in which 
its mix of under- and overdeterrence is most appropriate, which may 
optimize overall over- and underdeterrence better than any single doc-
trine could. 
Here, the metarule rests on the presence or absence of known crim-
inal or fraudulent activity. Where there is known criminal or fraudu-
187. Einer Elhauge, The Triggering Function of Sale of Control Doctrine, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1465 (1992). 
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lent activity, this metarule "triggers" what is in effect a general 
standard to police undesirable advice about the level of expected sanc-
tions. Although such a general standard has the serious overdeter-
rence problems we raised above, it does reduce underdeterrence of 
undesirable advice. It is thus particularly well suited for a class of 
cases in which underdeterrence problems predominate, which by hy-
pothesis are the cases triggered by the crime-fraud rule. Outside of the 
crime-fraud area, overdeterrence concerns become far more serious, 
and underdeterrence concerns less serious. There, the traditional per-
mission of advice, which reduces overdeterrence of desirable advice at 
the expense of underdeterring undesirable advice, may be more appro-
priate. Arguably, this triggering approach can minimize the overall 
harm from the overdeterrence of desirable advice and underdeterrence 
of undesirable advice more effectively than applying in all cases either 
a rule of permission or a general standard prohibiting undesirable 
advice. 
The ultimate plausibility and wisdom of this account as a guide to 
policymaking depends critically on the underlying assumptions. If the 
categories of crime and fraud exclude many laws that have little over-
inclusion or overdeterrence, the current bright-line rules of legality 
may significantly underdeter undesirable advice. Critics of the tradi-
tional rules clearly believe this is a significant problem. 188 
Cutting the other way, however, is the present expansion of crimi-
nal law to cover less egregious forms of misconduct and to "price" 
conduct that has substantial social benefits. 189 This expansion sug-
gests that, in many cases, advice that corrects overestimations of crim-
inal sanctions, even for known criminal conduct, may have substantial 
social value because the conduct is itself desirable. The social value of 
the advice is likely to be even higher for conduct bordering on criminal 
188. Thus, in discussing corporate counsel's responsibilities in the Ford Pinto case, David 
Luban argues that "it can make no difference whether or not Ford's actions in the Pinto situation 
violated a criminal statute: it is the actions themselves rather than their legal classification that 
give rise to the need for whistleblowing." See LUBAN, supra note 9, at 215; see also Simon, supra 
note 1, at 1127 (arguing in support of his "discretionary" approach that categorical norms "tend 
to be both overinclusive and underinclusive relative to their purposes"). 
Not surprisingly, defenders of the traditional approach point to cases in which non-criminal 
regulation prohibits desirable conduct. See, e.g., John K. Villa, Emerging Theories of Liability 
for Lending Counsel, in THE ATTORNEY CLIENT RELATIONSHIP, supra note 55, at 93, 153-55 
(describing cases in which conduct violating regulations governing loan underwriting may be 
socially desirable). 
189. See Coffee, Paradigms Lost, supra note 165, at 1878-82 (discussing criminalization of 
common law of breach offiduciary duty, growth of vicarious liability, and proliferation of federal 
regulations with potential criminal penalties); Coffee, Reflections, supra note 165, at 208-09 
(describing criminalization of breach of contract); id. at 228-29 ("The negligent [crill)inal] de· 
fendant is frequently engaged in activities that have social utility and, indeed, is the same person 
with whom the Jaw of torts regularly deals."). 
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behavior that might be mistaken for it. The expansion of criminal law 
also suggests that fairness considerations may increasingly justify ad-
vice that corrects underestimations of expected sanctions for such con-
duct because actors may correctly believe that such conduct is socially 
desirable. In either instance, the standard governing the provision of 
advice about criminal conduct may increasingly overdeter desirable 
advice. 19° Critics of current professional rules have neglected this risk. 
IV. KNOWLEDGE ABOUT SANCTIONS AND ACOUSTIC 
SEPARATION 
Those familiar with Meir Dan-Cohen's analysis of acoustic separa-
tion may find it odd that we bring it up in this article. After all, Dan-
Cohen's work is a piece of jurisprudence, not rational actor modeling. 
But, reconsidered in light of the preceding analysis, his acoustic sepa-
ration argument in fact can be mined for several insights into general 
questions about the desirability of encouraging or discouraging the 
dissemination of knowledge about legal sanctions. 
A. Dan-Cohen's Analysis 
Dan-Cohen begins with a well-established jurisprudential distinc-
tion: that between conduct rules and decision rules. 191 Conduct rules 
are legal rules directed at the general public and intended to guide its 
conduct. Decision rules are legal rules directed at government officials 
and intended to guide their adjudication of the public's conduct. 
One might think this distinction has little practical significance. 
Conduct rules that define illegal conduct and its penalty would neces-
sarily seem to imply a parallel decision rule: that officials should apply 
that conduct rule and impose the penalty it provides on violations 
thereof. Conversely, a decision rule that officials should condemn and 
punish certain behavior appears to imply a parallel conduct rule: that 
individuals should avoid such behavior or suffer the penalty the deci-
sion rule authorizes. But, Dan-Cohen argues, this parallel is not com-
pelled logically, empirically, or normatively. 
Logically, the judge who applies, for example, the rule forbidding 
theft is not bound by the conduct rule that prohibits theft; failing to 
impose the proper penalty on theft does not itself constitute theft. 192 
The judge is bound rather by a decision rule for imposing punishment, 
190. Indeed, if the phenomenon of criminal sanctions for conduct with some social value 
were to become sufficiently widespread, even a prohibition on assisting such conduct might sweep 
too broadly. 
191. Dan-Cohen, supra note 14, at 625-30. 
192. Id. at 628. 
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one element of which may be the conduct rule defining theft. Imagine, 
then, that adjudicators and the general public are separated into differ-
ent acoustically sealed chambers. In that event the legal regime could 
communicate decision rules to adjudicators without those rules being 
overheard (and turned into conduct rules) by the general public. 193 
Decision rules need not logically be the same as conduct rules. 
Empirically, of course, conditions of complete acoustic separation 
hardly ever exist. The general public does hear about adjudicative de-
cisions. But, Dan-Cohen argues, often conditions of partial acoustic 
separation do exist.194 The general public may have difficulty grasp-
ing, or find it too costly to learn, the complex decision rules that are 
directed at adjudicators and may thus rely on the more simple conduct 
rules directed at the general public. Moreover, sometimes the legal 
regime can, perhaps not intentionally, employ a strategy of selective 
transmission, which furthers or protects the acoustic separation be-
tween conduct rules and decision rules. These strategies include mis-
leading maxims, legal vagueness and complexity, giving technical legal 
meanings to ordinary words, and denying defenses to those likely to 
have or obtain legal sophistication before acting.195 
One example of this selective transmission appeared in the intro-
duction to this article. "Ignorance of the law is no excuse" is the sim-
ple but misleading maxim of conduct disseminated to the general 
public; the actual decision rule involves a complex set of conflicting 
factors weighing for and against allowing the defense.196 The very 
simplicity of the maxim, compared to the complexity of the factors, 
makes it likely that partial acoustic separation can exist between the 
conduct rule reflected in the maxim and the decision rule reflected in 
the complex of factors. 
Another example, Dan-Cohen argues, lies in the defenses of duress 
or necessity.197 These defenses are so vague and complex that the av-
erage citizen cannot understand or rely on them. Thus the general 
public tends to be guided by a conduct rule that corresponds to the 
legal violations shorn of these defenses, while the defenses do form 
193. Id. at 630. 
194. Id. at 634. 
195. Id. at 639-40, 648, 652. Another strategy might be to prevent lawyers from learning the 
information in the first place. In the past, for example, the Internal Revenue Service did not 
make private revenue rulings or internal auditing standards publicly available. And, arguably 
the published antitrust merger guidelines were stricter than the actual practice of the Department 
of Justice's Antitrust Division during the Reagan Administration. Of course, such strategies put 
a premium on hiring ex-IRS agents, or ex-lawyers from the Antitrust Division, as accountants or 
lawyers. We are indebted to Walter Blum for this point. 
196. Id. at 645-48. 
197. Id. at 639-45. 
November 1993] Legal Sanctions 329 
part of the decision rule used by courts. Moreover, courts tend to 
deny the defenses to individuals who have special legal sophistication 
or are in circumstances that lend themselves to prolonged deliberation 
over, and perhaps obtaining advice concerning, the legal consequences 
of contemplated conduct. This occurs, Dan-Cohen argues, because 
there is little acoustic separation in these cases and thus no way to 
effectively keep the conduct and decision rules distinct. 
Normatively, is such selective transmission desirable? Not always, 
Dan-Cohen concedes, but the conclusion that decision rules and con-
duct rules should be identical is not always normatively compelled 
either. Instead, the matter must be decided in each area in accord 
with the policies and values that seem relevant. 198 Consider, for exam-
ple, selective transmission regarding the defenses of duress and neces-
sity. Obscuring these defenses from conduct rules, Dan-Cohen argues, 
can have beneficial behavioral effects: it helps ensure that individuals 
commit legal violations only when they truly think the alternatives are 
worse than the legal penalties.199 But allowing these defenses in deci-
sion rules avoids the unfairness or harshness of punishing behavior 
that was compelled by circumstances beyond the actor's control. 200 
Without acoustic separation and selective transmission, the law must 
choose between good behavioral effects and fairness in adjudication. 
With them, the law can have both. Therefore, Dan-Cohen concludes, 
it is far from obvious that selective transmission is normatively 
undesirable. 2o1 
B. Acoustic Separation in Our Model 
Dan-Cohen sums up his analysis as follows: "[W]e may expect the 
law to engage in selective transmission (1) under conditions of partial 
acoustic separation, and (2) in pursuit of policies that are best served 
by decision rules that differ from the corresponding conduct rules."202 
We can use our framework to specify, generalize, and then extend 
these conclusions. 
In all of Dan-Cohen's examples of partial acoustic separation, the 
conduct rules transmitted to the public exaggerate the scope of crimi-
nal conduct by omitting or obscuring defenses or limitations. We can 
thus rephrase his first condition more specifically as "(1) individuals 
overestimate the scope of conduct subject to criminal sanctions." Fur-
198. Id. at 629, 634. 
199. Id. at 633, 638. 
200. Id. at 633-34, 637. 
201. See generally id. at 665-77 (assessing the legitimacy of selective transmission). 
202. Id. at 636. 
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ther, in all the examples meeting his second condition, the decision 
rules are more lax than the conduct rules that would optimize behav-
ior. We can thus rephrase this second condition more specifically as 
"(2) the scope of conduct subject to criminal sanctions is narrower 
than would, if known, optimize behavior."203 If these two conditions 
are met, then it may be desirable for society to promote good behavior 
by employing a strategy of selective transmission: that is, by diminish-
ing the knowledge citizens possess about legal sanctions. Curbing 
legal advice, the strategy we have focused on until now, is one way of 
furthering this acoustic separation. But the other methods Dan-Co-
hen cites - such as vagueness, complexity, misleading maxims, and 
giving technical definitions to ordinary words - are other 
possibilities. 
Our framework further suggests two immediate ways to generalize 
Dan-Cohen's claims. First, the conclusion applies to civil conduct as 
well as criminal. Second, the conclusion applies to overestimations of 
the level as well as scope of expected sanctions. Thus we may genera-
lize as follows. If (1) persons overestimate expected sanctions 
(whether because they exaggerate the scope of criminal conduct or 
some other reason); and (2) the actual level of expected sanctions, if 
known, would offer less than optimal deterrence (whether because of 
the defenses and limitations contained in decision rules to pursue 
nondeterrence goals or some other reason), then a strategy of dimin-
ishing knowledge about legal sanctions (such as curbing legal advice) 
may be desirable to prevent the overestimations from being corrected. 
This generalization would suggest, for example, that, in addition to 
communicating simple harsh conduct rules and obscuring the substan-
tive defenses, the law might (as long as acoustic separation exists) 
profitably pursue a strategy of selective transmission by threatening 
long prison terms for conduct even though the legal regime in fact 
ameliorates those sentences with a complex regime of judicial discre-
tion and probationary releases. 
We may further use our framework to specify the circumstances in 
which the behavioral consequences of such efforts to diminish knowl-
edge about legal sanctions will in fact be desirable.204 Namely, when-
203. Dan-Cohen emphasizes that decision rules might be narrower than behaviorally optimal 
rules because of nonbehavioral goals such as fairness in adjudication or limiting the discretion of 
adjudicators. Id. at 633-34, 648, 650-51, 661-64. While our model includes such nonbehavioral 
goals, we also recognize that decision rules may be narrower than behaviorally optimal for a host 
of other reasons as well. See supra section I.B.2. 
204. Whether the resulting improvements in behavior will justify the use of selective trans-
mission, in this or any other case, also depends on the fairness of allowing some actors to proceed 
in ignorance. See supra section III.A and infra text accompanying and following notes 207-09. 
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ever condition (3) is met: "The socially desirable overestimations of 
sanctions for undesirable conduct outweigh (on whatever normative 
scale one wishes to apply) the socially undesirable overestimations of 
sanctions for desirable conduct. "205 This condition might be met be-
cause potential undesirable actors make more errors or larger errors of 
overestimation than potential desirable actors. Or it might be met be-
cause the undesirable conduct encouraged by full advice tends to do 
more harm than· the desirable conduct encouraged by advice does 
good. 
Unless overestimations of sanctions for desirable and undesirable 
conduct systemically differ, this third condition should generally fol-
low from the second condition that sanctions are lower than those that 
would optimize behavior if fully known. 206 This is because, starting 
from such below optimal sanctions, an actual increase in expected 
sanctions for both undesirable and desirable conduct would, by defini-
tion, have behavioral effects that are, on balance, socially beneficial. A 
perceived increase in expected sanctions should have similar behavioral 
effects, as long as the overestimations exhibit no systemic divergence. 
Our framework also suggests two extensions to Dan-Cohen's 
claims. First, the analysis applies to underestimations as well as over-
estimations. Thus, the behavioral consequences of a strategy of selec-
tive transmission (such as curbing legal advice) should be socially 
desirable if (1) persons underestimate expected sanctions, (2) the ac-
tual level of expected sanctions is excessively high, and (3) the under-
estimations for desirable conduct outweigh the underestimations for 
undesirable conduct. As in the last paragraph, the third condition 
should generally follow from the second. 
For example, consider antitrust liability for joint ventures. Sup-
pose that the level of expected sanctions for joint ventures is too high. 
Suppose, further, that businesses would be unaware of this potential 
liability without legal advice. They would, in other words, underesti-
mate expected sanctions. Under these facts, a curb on antitrust advice 
might have desirable behavioral effects because such advice would dis-
courage more desirable joint ventures than undesirable joint ventures. 
The second extension involves cases in which over- and underesti-
mations coexist and systemically diverge. Thus, the behavioral conse-
205. Dan-Cohen expressly recognizes this point with respect to overestimations of sanctions 
for criminal conduct. Dan-Cohen, supra note 14, at 638 & n.29 ("The law's traditional resistance 
to allowing the defenses considered here in any but the most extreme cases may be understood to 
imply a belief that the benefits foregone because of overdeterrence in this area are more than 
offset by the danger of reduced obedience to the law that allowing these defenses would bring 
about."). 
206. See supra section 11.B. 
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quences of selective transmission will be desirable if (1) persons 
overestimate expected sanctions for undesirable conduct and underes-
timate them for desirable conduct, and (2) the actual level of expected 
sanctions does not perfectly deter the conduct under consideration. 
Suppose, for example, unadvised individuals would both exaggerate 
the odds of being caught for insider trading and understate the odds of 
being held liable for trading when they had no inside information. In 
such a scenario, improving knowledge about legal sanctions can only 
worsen their behavior. 
This last scenario, while perhaps rarer, provides when applicable 
the most sweeping justification for selective transmission because it 
should improve behavior even if fully disclosed sanctions would opti-
mize behavior. Indeed, if selective transmission can be used in such a 
scenario, it will often be possible to improve behavior even further by 
adjusting sanctions away from the levels that would be optimal with-
out selective transmission. Suppose, for example, that in the insider 
trading example the optimal sanction would, if known, equal the 
trader's stock profits given actual under- and oversanctioning. If with 
selective transmission insider traders would overestimate sanctions 
and innocent traders would underestimate them, then coupling selec-
tive transmission with an increase in actual sanctions to some multiple 
of trading profits may further optimize behavior. This is because the 
combination of selective transmission with such a sanction multiplier 
can reduce underdeterrence but still keep overdeterrence below the 
level that would be optimal if individuals accurately estimated 
sanctions. 
All this might suggest that advice or knowledge about legal sanc-
tions is far less justifiable than our prior argument would indicate. Af-
ter all, in any of the above three scenarios, advice or knowledge about 
sanctions will have socially undesirable behavioral effects. This obser-
vation may tempt one to conclude that, at least for those areas of law 
where legal sanctions do not optimize behavior, we should discourage 
advice or knowledge about those legal sanctions. 
This conclusion would, however, be premature. To begin, even 
when selective transmission strategies have clearly desirable behav-
ioral effects, they may face strong fairness objections. From a fairness 
perspective, the least problematic scenario is that analyzed by Dan-
Cohen, in which behavioral improvements result from preserving 
overestimations of sanctions for undesirable conduct.207 As argued 
above, it is difficult to describe a persuasive principle of fairness which 
207. See supra section IV.A. 
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requires informing a potential bad actor that he can get away with 
misconduct.208 The fair notice claim to advice will be particularly 
weak if, as in Dan-Cohen's account, the use of selective transmission is 
limited to the criminal law. Hence, in the first scenario, actors would 
have a meritorious fairness claim to advice only in those relatively rare 
instances when the fair fight principle applies.209 
However, the second and third scenarios raise more troubling fair-
ness concerns. In the second scenario, selective transmission preserves 
a state in which underestimations of excessive sanctions for desirable 
conduct outweigh underestimations of sanctions for undesirable con-
duct. Because this strategy achieves its improvements in behavior by 
keeping desirable actors in ignorance of the legal risks that they run, it 
violates basic principles of fair notice. Some may regard this as a deci-
sive objection to the use of this strategy. 
In the third scenario, selective transmission achieves behavioral 
improvements both (1) by failing to correct underestimations for desir-
able conduct, and (2) by failing to correct overestimations for undesir-
able conduct. The latter aspect ordinarily poses no fairness concerns. 
The strength of the fairness objection to this strategy thus depends on 
the extent to which it achieves its behavioral effects by failing to cor-
rect underestimations of sanctions for desirable conduct. 
More fundamentally, each of the three scenarios in which selective 
transmission can improve behavior has a mirror image in which advice 
or knowledge about sanctions would clearly improve behavior. In the 
mirror image of the first scenario, actors may underestimate insuffi-
cient sanctions instead of overestimating them. For example, they 
might think that criminal penalties are much lower than they actually 
are because of press coverage given to convicts released on parole. 
In the mirror image of the second scenario, actors may overesti-
mate excessive sanctions instead of underestimating them. They 
might, for example, think that the probability and magnitude of puni-
tive damage awards in product liability cases are far higher than they 
actually are. This might result from extensive media coverage given 
those few cases in which punitive damages are assessed or from the 
media's tendency to give more coverage to high jury awards than to 
the judicial decisions reducing those awards. 
Finally, in the mirror image of the third scenario, people may un-
derestimate sanctions for undesirable conduct and overestimate sanc-
tions for desirable conduct. They might, for example, think both that 
208. See supra section III.A. 
209. See supra text accompanying notes 128-30. 
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the odds of being audited for an illegal deduction are lower than they 
are, and that the odds of being audited for a lawful deduction are 
higher than they are. In each of these alternative scenarios, selective 
transmission will likely be undesirable and legal advice desirable. 
Absent evidence that the three troublesome scenarios occur more 
often than their opposites, advice and knowledge about sanctions must 
be regarded as ambiguous (rather than undesirable) in cases when 
sanctions, if known, would not optimize behavior. And, without such 
evidence, curbs on advice or other strategies of selective transmission 
must also be considered behaviorally ambiguous. In these behavior-
ally ambiguous scenarios, we think, fairness considerations will nor-
mally tip the balance in favor of full advice and knowledge. 
The fact that the topic of legal knowledge concerns nonoptimal 
sanctions thus does not alone suffice to justify a curb on the dissemina-
tion of legal knowledge about sanctions. Sometimes even knowledge 
about nonoptimal sanctions can be desirable. Rather, efforts to dimin-
ish legal knowledge about nonoptimal sanctions, if justifiable at all, 
must rest on careful, contextual assessments of the actual over- and 
underestimations of the scope and level of expected sanctions that 
would, given the topic at hand, be made by parties lacking advice or 
knowledge about the applicable legal sanctions. 
CONCLUSION 
Ever since Adam and Eve, taking from the tree of knowledge has 
sometimes had undesirable consequences. Knowledge about legal 
sanctions is no exception. Advice or knowledge about legal sanctions 
does not always have desirable behavioral effects even when sanctions 
are set to optimize behavior. Instead, because of inevitable impreci-
sions in any sanctioning regime, advice or knowledge about optimal 
sanctions often will have undesirable effects. 
However, as elsewhere in life, there is good reason to think that, 
despite some adverse consequences, more knowledge is on balance bet-
ter. Unless the distribution of legal ignorance that would exist without 
advice is skewed, the overall behavioral consequences of advice or 
knowledge about sanctions will tend to be socially desirable if society 
has set sanctions to optimize behavior. Furthermore, where sanctions 
are set to optimize nonbehavioral measures of social welfare, advice 
and knowledge about sanctions will have ambiguous behavioral conse-
quences, but may be justifiable on fairness grounds. 
Under our analysis, the desirability of legal counseling and litiga-
tion advice do not categorically differ. Both are prone to the same 
mixed effects, and both should on balance be desirable if the applicable 
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sanctions have been set to optimize behavior. Absent better empirical 
evidence, we have no reason to conclude that the sanctions for pri-
mary conduct are any less optimal than the sanctions for litigation 
conduct. And, without such evidence, nothing suggests that advice 
about the sanctions applicable to primary conduct is any more or less 
desirable than advice about the sanctions applicable to litigation 
conduct. 
A more tailored approach for curbing those forms of advice that 
are likely to lead to undesirable consequences may be justifiable. But 
open-ended efforts to screen out such undesirable advice, such as that 
advocated by William Simon, are likely to face insuperable problems 
of overdeterrence. They are, in other words, likely to screen out too 
much desirable advice as well. The approach taken by current law, 
targeting only those categories of advice that further known crimes or 
frauds, better redresses the problem of underdeterred undesirable ad-
vice without excessively overdeterring desirable advice. 
Finally, even when sanctions do not optimize behavior, it is not 
true that advice or knowledge about sanctions is generally undesirable. 
Sometimes the behavioral consequences will be undesirable, but other 
times they will be desirable. Absent more particular evidence about 
what exactly unadvised or ignorant parties would over- or underesti-
mate, the overall behavioral effect of advice or knowledge about non-
optimal sanctions must be regarded as ambiguous. Given this 
behavioral ambiguity, the fairness considerations in favor of legal ad-
vice are often controlling. 
